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Abstract 
Beyond the drama of the European Council summit of 18-19 February 2016, what became 
clear was the fundamental desire on the part of the leaders of all 28 EU member states to 
agree a deal on the British government’s demands for a renegotiated settlement on the UK’s 
relationship within the European Union. The deal has provided David Cameron with the 
political capital he needed to call a date for the in/out referendum and to lead a campaign 
for the UK to stay in the EU. Yet, for all the technical reforms packed into it, the deal is 
neither a crowd pleaser nor a vote winner. It does, however, mark a watershed 
acknowledgement that EU integration is not a one-directional process of ‘ever closer union’. 
Different paths of integration are now open to member states that do not compel them 
towards a common destination. This deal will effectively lead to a legally binding 
recognition that the UK is not committed to further political integration in the EU. 
In this Special Report, Stefani Weiss and Steven Blockmans analyse the substance of the 
“Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, 
concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union” and 
shed light on its legal character. They do so by contextualising this EU deal to avoid Brexit, 
and draw on the conclusions reached in a simulation of European Council negotiations 
between representatives of think tanks in the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), 
conducted by CEPS and the Bertelsmann Stiftung in October 2015. 
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The EU deal to avoid Brexit: 
Take it or leave 
Stefani Weiss and Steven Blockmans* 
CEPS Special Report No. 131 / February 2016 
ith its all-night negotiations, ‘war room’ of lawyers, heated private consultations, 
and frustrated snippets delivered to a waiting press left to muse on the revised 
‘English’ menu over the day, the European Council meeting of 18-19 February 
2016 had all the theatrical trappings of a make-or-break summit. Beyond the drama, 
however, what became clear was the fundamental desire on the part of the leaders of all 28 
EU member states to agree a deal on the British government’s demands for a renegotiated 
settlement on the UK’s relationship within the European Union.  
As much as certain European leaders may have resented Prime Minister Cameron for the 
tactical blackmail he deployed to push through mostly technical reforms, which were either 
not a priority for them or cut against their interests, no-one wanted to see the summit fail or 
fan the flames of Brexit. At the same time, the heads of state or government were keen to 
ensure that the UK would not be allowed to reopen talks in the event of a ‘leave’ vote in the 
British referendum; an idea embraced by Mr. Cameron to kill the idea of a ‘neverendum’. 
And so they joined together in a move to adopt a ‘take it or leave’ clause in the deal.1 
Now that the play is over and the curtain closed we are left wondering if there is any clarity 
in what was agreed. The short answer is No, because it is highly unlikely that the 
referendum on whether the UK should stay in or leave the EU will be decided on the 
minutiae of any reform to child benefits or tax credits. David Cameron will have to campaign 
on bigger ticket issues if he wishes to convince his electorate that it is better for the UK to 
remain in the EU. 
Yet the deal is important, for at least four reasons. First, it has provided Mr Cameron with 
the political capital he needed from his fellow European leaders to call a date for the in/out 
referendum and to lead a campaign for the UK to stay in the European Union.  
Second, it marks a watershed acknowledgement that EU integration is not a one-directional 
process of ‘ever closer union’ but that “different paths of integration [are] available [that] do 
not compel all member states to aim for a common destination”. It will effectively lead to a 
                                                     
* Stefani Weiss is Director of the Brussels Office of the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Steven Blockmans is Head of 
EU Foreign Policy at CEPS and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance at the University of 
Amsterdam. This Special Report is the final product of the project “The UK and the EU: Simulating the 
agendas for EU reform” conducted jointly by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and CEPS. 
1 See para. 4 of the conclusions of the European Council: “It is understood that, should the result of the 
referendum in the United Kingdom be for it to leave the European Union, the set of arrangements referred 
to in paragraph 2 above [i.e. the Decision and flanking statement and declarations] will cease to exist.” This 
sentence was inserted on the insistence of Belgium, backed by France.  
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legally binding recognition that the UK is not committed to further political integration in 
the EU.  
Third, it lays down commitments to change secondary EU legislation, for instance on the free 
movement of workers and the coordination of social security systems, and to incorporate the 
substance of parts of the deal in the EU treaties at the time of their next revision.  
Finally, the deal has set a precedent whereby one member state successfully held the rest of 
the EU to ransom until its demands were met. As Euroscepticism grows throughout the 
Union, there is a risk of contagion: (future) leaders of other member states could refer to the 
UK deal and threaten to steer their own country out of the Union (‘Frexit', ‘Plexit', etc.) if its 
special relationship within the EU is not secured. The ‘take it or leave’ or ‘self-destruct' clause 
inserted into the deal at the last minute will not deter copycat exception-seekers2 because the 
genie is now out of the bottle. 
This paper analyses the substance of the “Decision of the Heads of State or Government, 
meeting within the European Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom 
within the European Union” and sheds light on its legal character. It does so by 
contextualising this EU deal to avoid Brexit, in part by drawing on the conclusions reached 
in a simulation of European Council negotiations between representatives of think tanks in 
the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), conducted by CEPS and the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung in October 2015.3 
Inception 
The Brexit scenario was opened up by the UK’s own Prime Minister more than three years 
ago. In an effort to deal with the ‘Europe’ question that has vexed his Conservative Party and 
Britain for decades, Cameron delivered his famous Bloomberg speech on 23 January 2013. In 
this speech he promised not only to negotiate better terms for the UK’s EU membership but – 
after a successful renegotiation – to let the British people decide in a referendum whether 
they would rather remain in the EU or leave. Despite this high-stakes gamble with the future 
of his party, country and the entire EU, and despite the generally positive assessment of his 
administration’s ‘Balance of Competences Review’ at the end of 2014, the British Prime 
Minister did not develop a ‘plan de campagne’.4  In fact, he had to be pressed by his 
colleagues in the European Council to end months of speculation about the terms for 
renegotiation. In his letter of 10 November 2015 to European Council President Tusk, 
                                                     
2 Para. 4 of the European Council conclusions carries some legal clout when read in conjunction with para. 1 
of Section E of the Decision itself: “Any Member State may ask the President of the European Council that 
an issue relating to the application of this Decision be discussed in the European Council.” In other words, 
if invoked by a member state as a basis to seek its own exceptional deal, any other member state can oppose 
the application of the deal with the UK in the future. 
3 See S. Blockmans and S. Weiss, “Will Cameron Get What He Wants? Anticipating reactions to Britain’s EU 
reform proposals”, CEPS Commentary, 29 October 2015. 
4 Where the British government failed to draw conclusions from the exercise, CEPS plugged the gap. See the 
contributions to M. Emerson (ed.), Britain’s Future in Europe: Reform, Renegotiation, Repatriation, or Secession? 
(Brussels/London, CEPS/Rowman and Littlefield 2015). 
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Cameron effectively listed the four reform ‘baskets’ that had already become the subject of 
wide public debate.5  
The first item on his reform agenda related to the issue of sovereignty. The UK wanted to 
receive an opt-out from the “ever closer union” mentioned in the preamble and Article 1 of 
the Treaty on European Union. In addition, Cameron demanded the creation of a ‘red card’ 
procedure for national parliaments to halt draft EU legislation. The second basket on 
economic governance was intended to ring-fence the City of London from potentially 
harmful EU financial and banking regulations (on, for example, capital ratios, a split between 
investment and retail divisions). Furthermore, the UK effectively suggested the introduction 
of a veto against decisions taken by a presumed ‘eurozone caucus’ within the Council. The 
third and only basket framed in positive terms called for the strengthening of the 
competitiveness of the internal market. Finally, Cameron demanded derogations from the 
rules on the free movement of labour to be able to restrict the social benefits and tax credits 
claimed by EU migrant workers in the UK for a period of up to four years. 
Generally speaking, other member state capitals gave a rather cool reception to three out of 
the four EU reform demands. But hopes were raised that a deal could be reached when 
David Cameron gave a conciliatory speech at the December 2015 European Council meeting. 
President Tusk kept a tight rein on the technical negotiations in preparation for the summit 
in February. Consultations were intended to help the UK successfully conclude the 
renegotiation of its position within the EU. Other member states were not allowed to muddy 
the waters with counterclaims on issues other than the four under negotiation. Nobody 
seemed ready to contemplate failure and for this reason no plan B was prepared.  
This approach was reflected in the “Draft Decision of the Heads of State or Government, 
meeting within the European Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom 
within the European Union”, released by President Tusk on 2 February 2016. Most EU 
member states welcomed the draft and called it a good and fair basis for negotiations. 
Sticking points remained of course, with France and Germany opposing any special rules for 
the City of London, and Poland and other eastern member states drawing red lines on 
aspects of intra-EU migration, as did Belgium, Greece and Italy on ever closer union.6 But the 
prevailing mood among the diplomats charged with negotiating the draft text in-between 
brackets was that where there is so obviously a political will, there will also be a way.  
Despite the delays and drama of the European Council summit of 18-19 February, it comes 
as no real surprise that the heads of state or government endorsed the New Settlement7 for 
the United Kingdom within the European Union.  
                                                     
5 See M. Emerson, “Dear Donald … Yours, David”, CEPS Commentary, 12 November 2015. 
6 These indications are reflected in the national position papers that underpinned the Simulation Game 
organised with EPIN think tankers. See Appendix. 
7
 The UK Settlement documents are now published in the Official Journal/C 69I, pp. 1–16:  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.CI.2016.069.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2016:069I:TOC, 
23 February 2016. 
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The deal 
Section A: Economic governance 
From the outset, the wish to obtain safeguards for the UK against legal acts or 
intergovernmental agreements directly linked to the functioning of the euro area featured 
very high on the British government’s list of demands. Unsurprisingly, the attempt to rein in 
eurozone affairs did not fall on fertile ground among the countries with the euro as their 
single currency, as ‘represented’ in our simulation game. France and Germany were 
especially critical of introducing instruments that would give veto powers to ‘euro-outs’. The 
most federalist in this regard were the member states to the south, i.e. those who had 
suffered the most from the euro crisis. They argued that more, not less, integration was 
needed to overcome the crisis, so the UK should not be granted any rights inhibiting the 
eurozone from progressing into a true economic and monetary union, and even further into 
a political union. Interestingly, even the non-euro member states that shared the concern of 
being sidelined and overruled by euro group decisions only cautiously supported the British 
case. 
As one of the two EU members with an opt-out from the single currency union, the UK had 
long feared discrimination and being overruled by a growing eurozone caucus in the 
Council. This fear grew after the euro crisis forced the eurozone to become even more active 
in financial market regulations and to proceed with deepening integration in order to 
stabilise the single currency. Besides, the UK felt strongly about ring-fencing its own 
financial institutions against EU financial legislation taken, for example, in the realm of bank 
capital requirements or caps on bankers’ bonuses, which were seen as undermining the 
competitive edge of the City of London. Furthermore, Prime Minister Cameron wanted to 
foreclose once and for all the possibility of the UK being drawn into bail-outs of eurozone 
countries, as had happened with Greece. 
The ‘New Settlement’ addresses all of the British government’s concerns. Against the threat 
of unduly discriminating against non-euro countries, the Decision states that no eurozone 
legislation should set up barriers or otherwise interfere with the internal market or trade 
among member states and should “respect the competences, rights and obligations of 
Member States whose currency is not the euro” (para. 1). Moreover, the Decision clarifies 
that non-euro countries or member states that are not participating in the banking union 
cannot be held accountable for any emergency or crisis measures taken to safeguard the 
financial stability of the eurozone and would be fully reimbursed for their part where the EU 
budget is drawn upon for rescue measures (para. 3). 
As regards banking union, with its newly established single rulebook for banking 
supervision and resolution, the UK and the other non-euro members were assured of the 
right to execute their own authority over their financial institutions (para. 4). To this end, 
member states recognised that this might also necessitate exceptions from the uniform 
application of the single rulebook for non-euro member states. Yet, what form these 
exceptions could take was one of the highly contested issues left for decision by the heads of 
state or government.  
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Given the systemic risks that big banks pose – not only to their countries of residence but 
also to the financial stability of the entire European Union – a carte blanche for the UK was 
never going to be acceptable. In the end, the UK received no derogations but merely the 
acknowledgement that “specific provisions within the single rulebook and other relevant 
instruments may be necessary, while preserving the level playing field and contributing to 
financial stability” (para. 2). It was France, in particular, that drew a red line here. The fact 
that the wording of the draft Decision was tightened from “different provisions” to “specific 
provisions” and that the text underlines the "level playing field" in the area of financial 
regulation means that there will be no special favours for the City of London vis-à-vis the 
eurozone. 
Another hotly contested issue, until the very last minute of the summit negotiations, 
concerned the demand for a British veto in the banking union and other related eurozone 
affairs. A separate statement containing a draft Council Decision was annexed to the deal to 
reflect the compromise reached on new voting procedures in the (Ecofin) Council.8 This 
measure will only enter into force when the Decision as a whole takes effect, i.e. on the day 
the British government informs the Secretary-General of the Council that the UK has decided 
to remain a member of the EU. 
Our simulation of summit negotiations had anticipated nearly all euro member states 
drawing a red line with regard to emergencies in the banking sector or the liquidity of 
member states, situations that demand quick decision-taking. A minor exception was 
Ireland, whose ‘representative’ held that the double-majority voting mechanism for euro-ins 
and -outs in the European Banking Authority regulation could be replicated in the Council.  
In real life, it was obvious from the first draft Decision issued by Tusk on 2 February 2016 
onwards that the British government would not get its veto. In fact, the draft did not mention 
it at all. The final text of the Decision even goes so far as to emphasise that there cannot be a 
veto power for non-euro members in Council decision-making, even if the concerns of one of 
the countries is referred to the European Council for discussion.9 
Instead, non-euro members will only have the right to delay decisions taken by qualified 
majority in the Council on matters pertaining to the effective management of the banking 
union and to the consequences of further integration of the euro area. Thereafter, as the first 
step, non-euro members will have the right to ask the Council to reconsider the decision 
“with the intent to facilitate a wider basis for agreement”. As a second step, and only if 
facilitation by the Presidency of the Council fails, a non-euro member state will be entitled to 
turn to the European Council for further discussion. The agreement says nothing about the 
outcome of such a discussion, but only after the European Council has been involved can the 
Council take over again for a final decision. 
                                                     
8 Statement containing a draft Council Decision on specific provisions relating to the effective management 
of the banking union and of the consequences of further integration of the euro area which will be adopted 
on the day the Decision referred to in point (a) takes effect (Annex II). 
9 Ibid., Article 1(3). 
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Finally, the draft text left one other issue in-between brackets for decision by the heads of 
state or government at the European Council meeting. It was whether an emergency brake to 
safeguard the interests of euro-outs could be triggered by one non-euro member state alone, 
as the UK wanted, or would need a higher quorum to invoke the procedure. On this, the UK 
won its case. 
Section A closes with the commitment that "the substance [contained therein] will be 
incorporated into the Treaties at the time of their next revision in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties and the respective constitutional requirements of the 
Member States", an issue we shall return to later.  
Section B: Competitiveness 
From the outset, all member states supported Cameron in his call for a more competitive EU 
that could generate jobs and growth. Since President Juncker took office, the strengthening of 
competitiveness was also high on the agenda of the Commission. The Better Regulation 
Package, and the commitment to introduce an ‘Annual Burden Survey’ (an overview of the 
existing stock of EU legislation) in support of its Regulatory Fitness and Performance 
Programme (REFIT) programme, are examples of this prioritisation.  
Accordingly, in our simulation, as in the real negotiations, this basket never constituted a 
serious obstacle to reaching an agreement. Of course, different member states might have 
proposed different measures to be taken up under this heading. The Greek representative, 
for instance, worried about the rapid privatisation of state-owned companies in the energy 
sector and suggested additional measures (e.g. investment plans) to boost competitiveness. 
Representatives of other member states were more in line with the British approach geared 
towards further market liberalisation.  
What comes as a surprise in relation to the simulation experience is that the agreed 
competitiveness agenda in the ‘New Settlement’ Decision deals almost exclusively with 
procedures for simplifying legislation aimed at lowering administrative burdens and costs 
for citizens and enterprises. To this end, the Council has now been asked by the European 
Council “to examine the annual reviews conducted by the Commission under its Declaration 
on Subsidiarity with a view to ensuring that these are given appropriate follow up”.10 
But other than this focus on avoiding overregulation and cutting red tape, hardly any 
attention is paid to other elements of the EU’s competitiveness agenda. The EU’s ambition to 
pursue an active and ambitious trade policy is still flagged up. By contrast, our mock 
negotiations concentrated on the development of the internal market. As can be seen from 
the position papers appended to this report, considerable emphasis is placed on making the 
EU more competitive by providing fresh impetus to the completion of the Energy Union, the 
establishment of a digital market and the capital markets union. 
                                                     
10 Declaration of the Commission on a subsidiarity implementation mechanism and a burden reduction 
implementation mechanism (Annex III). 
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Section C: Sovereignty  
The UK was reassured that the phrase “ever closer union” (among the peoples of Europe) 
does not in itself offer “any basis for extending the scope of the Treaties or of EU secondary 
legislation” and does “not compel all Member States to aim for a common destination”. 
Significantly, the member states recognised that the UK already has a “specific situation” 
under the Treaties;11 that Britain “is not committed to further political integration into the 
European Union”; and that “the references to ever closer union do not apply to [it]”. The 
substance of this new opt-out will be incorporated into the Treaties at the time of their next 
revision.  
This new wording is important for Cameron, as it allows him to say to his opponents that the 
UK is not being dragged into a European superstate. Indeed, the UK seems to be getting “the 
best of both worlds”: European Economic Area (EEA) status with full voting rights. 
The recognition of the UK’s exceptionalism and the explicit break with the mantra of ‘ever 
closer union’ does herald a more pliable European Union. The fact that the EU institutions 
will in future have to consider a category of states that does not adhere to the references of 
ever closer union may lead to a change in their approach to the initiation, adoption, 
implementation, interpretation and enforcement of new legislation. After all, an overly 
integrationist approach may leave them vulnerable to challenges by the UK.12  
This suspicion is reinforced when reading that “competences conferred by the Member 
States on the Union can be modified, whether to increase or reduce them, only through a 
revision of the Treaties with the agreement of all Member States”. This message too could be 
interpreted as a warning by member states (like the UK) to ‘supranational' EU institutions 
like the Commission and the Court of Justice that ‘competence creep’ and ‘judicial activism’ 
will not be tolerated. However, the introduction of this sentence also makes it clear that the 
New Settlement does not diminish the competences of the EU. The deal itself, therefore, does 
not reduce the level of integration required from members of the eurozone, or indeed from 
member states (like the UK) that see the EU’s added value as only residing within the single 
market. 
By the same token, the deal recognises that “[t]he Treaties allow an evolution towards a 
deeper degree of integration among the Member States that share such a vision of their 
common future, without this applying to other Member States.” Whereas this sentence 
                                                     
11 The declarative part of the Decision lists 6 Protocols under which the UK has already obtained a specific 
status. 
12 See S. Booth and R. Ruparel, “What did the UK achieve in its EU renegotiation?”, Open Europe, 21 
February 2016. The authors refer to the fact that, in the past, the British government has complained that 
there have been “persistent efforts” by the European Commission to curb the UK’s opt-out of justice and 
home affairs, for instance by claiming that the UK is bound by commitments in this area made in EU 
agreements with third countries. This point also emanates from para. 4 of Section C of the Decision: “In 
particular, a measure adopted pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) on the area of freedom, security and justice does not bind the Member States 
covered by Protocols No 21 and No 22, unless the Member State concerned, where the relevant Protocol so 
allows, has notified its wish to be bound by the measure.”   
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recognises the drive towards ever closer union that is shared by countries like Belgium, 
which pushed hard to introduce the clarification in the text of the deal, it simultaneously 
reinforces the philosophy of a multi-speed EU which the UK wanted to see enshrined, black-
on-white, in the Decision. 
So far, however, the practical implications of this opt-out remain unclear. To a large extent, 
this matter will depend on how exactly the substance of the formula is incorporated into the 
future Treaties. 
Contrary to our mock conclusions (para. 5), the heads of state or governments of the 27 other 
member states were much more forthcoming in acknowledging that the UK is different and 
thus eligible for special treatment. For many of our figurative heads of state or government, 
‘ever closer union’ was still very close to their (sovereign) hearts. Although they were aware 
that the contentious phrase bears no direct (but only subsidiary, i.e. interpretative) legal 
consequences, they subscribed to the thrust of the guiding principle. Moreover, most shared 
the concern that giving up on this political idea would set a bad and potentially contagious 
precedent. But they were lenient, knowing that the substance of this particular branch of 
British exceptionalism would have to be incorporated into the Treaties at the next round of 
their revision.  
Another aspect to the question of ‘sovereignty’ concerned the UK’s ambition to strengthen 
the principle of subsidiarity by way of introducing a new blocking mechanism for national 
parliaments – the so-called ‘red card’ procedure. It was agreed that, within 12 weeks of the 
transmission of a new draft EU legislative act, a quorum of 55% of the votes allocated to 
national parliaments (i.e. 16 out of 28 parliaments) can call upon the Council (not the 
Commission!) to reconsider the draft act and, unless the draft is amended to accommodate 
the concerns expressed in the reasoned opinions, to discontinue considerations if they are 
seen as not complying with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.13 
Here again, the UK’s demands were accommodated to an extent not foreseen by our mock 
negotiators. Instead of adding yet another blocking mechanism to the existing and as yet 
underused ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures, they were only prepared to simplify 
and strengthen the available instruments and to consider the introduction of a ‘green card’ 
procedure as a constructive way of drawing national parliaments into the EU decision-
making process. Viewed from this perspective, both the high threshold required to activate 
the red card procedure, and the narrow grounds of subsidiarity to trigger it, are a good 
thing. After all, it will take a greater number of national parliaments to go against their own 
governments than for a minority of the latter (35% in QMV procedures) to block a proposal 
in the Council. 
Section D: Social benefits and free movement 
David Cameron’s plan to ban in-work benefits for migrants from other EU countries in the 
UK was certainly a major driver in his attempt to secure a new relationship within a 
                                                     
13 Article 7(1) of Protocol No. 2. 
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“reformed European Union”. Although there is no evidence that the inflow of foreign 
workers negatively affected the employment chances of British workers,14 the mood among 
Eurosceptics in the UK speaks otherwise. Arguably, Cameron could not have come back 
from Brussels without having secured tangible restrictions on intra-EU labour migration. 
Otherwise, his case for remaining in the EU would have come to nothing. 
The other EU member states were well aware of the importance of their concessions in this 
basket of reform demands to Cameron’s credibility in this campaign. On the other hand, his 
claim of curbing benefits only for citizens of other EU member states was so diametrically 
opposed to the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality as enshrined in 
the Treaties, that it was hard to see how the UK could be accommodated without damaging 
the fabric of the internal market and thereby the EU as a whole. From the outset, therefore, 
most member states have taken a firm stance and declared any attempt to limit the freedom 
of movement as non-negotiable. The in-work benefit issue, and even more so the UK’s 
demand to ban all child benefit for foreign workers with children living outside the UK, 
sparked one of the biggest rows at the summit. Poland, in particular, in view of its huge 
diaspora in the UK, spearheaded the opposition of the Visegrád countries. A compromise 
was only brokered at the very last minute. 
Here again, the British Prime Minister has achieved a deal that is very much at the upper end 
of what he could have hoped for. The Decision provides for measures avoiding or limiting 
flows of workers that threaten the social security system, the labour market or the public 
service of EU member states. In this respect, EU secondary legislation will be amended to 
allow for a temporary suspension of the distribution of national welfare benefits in the event 
of an “inflow of workers from other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an 
extended period of time”.15 
In such exceptional situations, “on a scale that affects essential aspects of [the] social security 
system (…) or which leads to difficulties which are serious and liable to persist in its 
employment market or are putting an excessive pressure on the proper functioning of its 
public services”, member states will be able to pull an emergency brake, “to limit access of 
Union workers newly entering its labour market to in-work benefits for a total period of up 
to four years”.16 
                                                     
14  See the 2012 Report of the British Home Office’s Migration Advisory Committee, available at 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257235/analysis-of-the-
impacts.pdf; and P. Lucchino, C. Rosazza-Bondibene and J. Portes, “Examining the Relationship between 
Immigration and Unemployment Using National Insurance Number Registration Data”, NIESR Discussion 
Paper No. 386, 9 January 2012, available at www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/ 
090112_163827.pdf. 
15 In particular, Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 
on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 1). 
16 The Decision reiterates the gist of recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the ability of member 
states to deny EU migrants access to out-of-work benefits, for instance if they do not have a job: “Member 
States may reject claims for social assistance by EU citizens from other Member States who do not enjoy a 
right of residence or are entitled to reside on their territory solely because of their job-search. This includes 
claims by EU citizens from other Member States for benefits whose predominant function is to cover the 
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It is remarkable that the European Commission is of the opinion “that the kind of 
information provided to it by the United Kingdom (…) shows the type of exceptional 
situation that the proposed safeguard mechanism is intended to cover exists in the United 
Kingdom today. Accordingly, the United Kingdom would be justified in triggering the 
mechanism in the full expectation of obtaining approval.”17 
Other than what the UK originally demanded, the principle of non-discrimination was taken 
into account. As a result, the restrictions will have to be graduated over time, from an initial 
complete exclusion to a growing eligibility for social benefits by foreign workers until after 
four years, when they will receive the same welfare payments as British citizens. This 
emergency brake will not operate permanently, as Mr Cameron has demanded, but can be 
invoked only for seven years. This is the maximum time span granted to member states in 
the negotiations with acceding states in order to restrict the free movement rights of citizens 
of the latter. 
It is important to note that the decision on the implementation of such a brake will not be 
taken by the Commission but by the Council. Again, this underlines the predominantly 
intergovernmentalist thrust of the Decision in the New Settlement for the UK. 
Moreover, EU leaders bowed to Mr Cameron’s second demand in this basket, and agreed to 
amend existing EU secondary legislation to allow member states to index child benefits, if 
these benefits are exported, to the standard of living of the country where the child resides.18 
This indexation will only apply to new migrants in the UK and from 2020 onwards all 
member states will have the right to this kind of indexation. In addition, existing legislation 
will be clarified to deal (once again) with the issue of marriages that the authorities consider 
to be sham and to provide for national law to apply to entry for family reunion of third 
country national family members with EU national principals.19 The Commission has also 
agreed to clarify whether or not national governments can refuse entry to or remove EU 
nationals who pose a threat, by widening the scope of criteria to include the individual’s past 
conduct and that this threat may not be imminent.20 
Overall, one cannot escape the conclusion that this package on social benefits and free 
movement presents the first-ever roll-back of integration in this area of EU activity. In our 
                                                                                                                                                                     
minimum subsistence costs, even if such benefits are also intended to facilitate access to the labour market 
of the host Member States.” 
17 Declaration of the European Commission on the Safeguard Mechanism referred to in paragraph 2(b) of 
Section D of the Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, 
concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union (Annex VI). 
18 See the intention of amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, p. 1), as 
expressed in the Declaration of the European Commission on the indexation of child benefits exported to a 
Member State other than that where the worker resides (Annex V). 
19 See the intention of amending Directive 2004/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77), as expressed in the Declaration of the 
European Commission on issues related to the abuse of the right of free movement of persons (Annex VII). 
20 Annex VII: “These clarifications will be developed in a Communication providing guidelines on the 
application of Union law on the free movement of Union citizens.” 
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simulation of negotiations within the European Council, representatives of EU member 
states took a very principled and integrationist stance towards the contentious issues in this 
basket. They withstood the pressure from the UK government to grant Britain, or any other 
member state for that matter, the right to suspend welfare payments to foreign EU workers. 
Instead, they argued that existing EU law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in two recent 
rulings, allows member states to take national measures to curb the abuse of in-work 
benefits, as long as these measures are non-discriminatory on grounds of nationality. 
Intergovernmental and legally binding? 
One of the fiercely debated questions during the summit was whether the changes in the 
UK's renegotiated settlement are legally binding. This follows on from the Prime Minister’s 
demand in his letter of 10 November 2015 that some of the concerns listed should be 
addressed by means of an instrument in a "formal, legally binding way’'. 
Paragraph 3 of the European Council conclusions seems to leave no doubt: “this Decision is 
legally binding” and “gives legal guarantee that the matters of concern to the United 
Kingdom as expressed in the letter of 10 November 2015 have been addressed”. However, as 
usual in law, the picture is more nuanced, and so the answer should really be ‘it depends’. 
To start with, the deal does not constitute a legal act of one of the institutions of the Union.21 
As a “Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council” 
it is therefore not an act that is covered by EU law and over which the Court of Justice of the 
EU has jurisdiction to decide on its validity or interpretation. 22  Rather, the Decision 
constitutes an intergovernmental agreement intending to offer clarification that “will have to 
be taken into consideration as being an instrument for the interpretation of the Treaties”.23 
As such, the Decision’s operative parts will be legally binding under international law, under 
the conditions prescribed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.24 The 
fragility of this regime lies in the fact that if the Court of Justice is called to rule on a conflict 
between international law and existing EU law, it may give preference to the latter. 25 
However, because the Decision supplements and interprets the existing EU treaties, it is 
                                                     
21 Cf. Articles 288 TFEU (legal acts of the institutions of the Union) and 15 TEU (list of institutions). 
22 Such a construction is not without precedence but follows the examples set by the heads of state or 
government meeting within the European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992 (to accommodate 
Danish concerns about the definition of the ambit ratione personae of the provisions of EU law referring to the 
concept of national), and in Brussels in June 2009 (to make sure that Irish concerns relating to, inter alia, 
taxation policy, the right to life, education and the family, and Ireland's traditional policy of military 
neutrality, would remain unaffected by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon). In each case, the 
Decision was followed up by a Protocol added to the Treaties on the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty 
and the Accession Treaty with Croatia, respectively. 
23 Para. 3 of the Decision. The agreement will need to be lodged with the Secretariat of the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter. 
24 Article 11 (expressions of consent to be bound) and 31(3)(a) (prerogative of signatories of treaties to adopt 
a subsequent act in simplified form to interpret the treaties). 
25 See, e.g., P.J. Kuijper et al., The Law of EU External Relations, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2015), 
Chapter 12 (The status of international law in the EU); and B. Van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External 
Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014), Chapter 7 (EU law and international law). 
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supposedly not contradicting them.26 Thus, the risk of the Court overturning the deal is 
limited, especially in view of its jurisprudence in which the Court declared that the Decision 
“has to be taken into consideration as being [an instrument] for the interpretation of the 
[Treaties]”. 27  As a final point in this regard, it should be remembered that the entire 
construction depends on the Decision actually taking effect, i.e. on the same date as the 
British government informs the Secretary-General of the Council that the UK has decided to 
remain a member of the EU.28 
As mentioned above, some parts of the Decision (for instance on limiting child benefits, 
introducing an emergency brake on in-work benefits, and tightening up rules on marriages 
of convenience) will have to be passed into separate secondary EU legislation before they can 
take legal effect. This would be done under the ordinary legislative procedure, which 
prescribes that a simple majority of the European Parliament needs to approve the legislative 
proposals made by the Commission.29 It is for this reason that Cameron tried to secure the 
support of the leaders of the Parliament’s three biggest political groups (EPP, S&N, and 
ALDE) in the days before the European Council meeting, and that three EP negotiators 
(‘sherpas’) participated in the summit negotiations. Notwithstanding this, the exact nature of 
the legislation – including possible amendments –  cannot, of course, be pre-empted. 
In this context, it is worth adding that also non-legislative action will be required to 
implement parts of the agreement. For instance, the Commission’s intention to develop 
clarifications on to whom national governments can refuse entry or remove from their 
territory will be laid down in a Communication providing guidelines on the application of 
Union law on the free movement of Union citizens. Another case in point is the Council’s 
acceptance to improve the management of the banking union by way of a decision that will 
supplement Council Decision 2009/857/EC.30 
Yet other parts of the Decision will have to be incorporated into the EU Treaties at the time of 
their next revision.31 Arguably, a future round of treaty revision will have to wait until after 
the referendum in the UK, the presidential elections in France in May 2017 and the next 
federal elections in Germany, in October of that year. It may be presumed that the extent of 
the changes to the economic governance and overall direction of integration of the Union 
envisaged by the New Settlement, as indeed additional amendments that other member 
                                                     
26 Again, the European Council is more unequivocal in its (political) conclusions, para. 3(iii): “the content of 
the Decision is fully compatible with the Treaties”. 
27 Ruling of the Court on the nature of the Edinburgh Decision in para. 40 of the Rottmann case (C-135/08, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:104). 
28 Section E of the Decision, para. 2. 
29 Such proposals will only be drawn up following the taking effect of the Decision, i.e. not before the UK 
has decided to remain in the EU. 
30 See the Draft Council Decision on specific provisions relating to the effective management of the banking 
union and of the consequences of further integration of the euro area (Annex II). 
31 With regard to future EU enlargements, the Decision notes that “appropriate transitional measures 
concerning free movement of persons will be provided for in the relevant Acts of Accession to be agreed by 
all Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. In this context, the position expressed by the United 
Kingdom in favour of such transitional measures is noted.”  
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states,32 the Commission and the European Central Bank may wish to introduce, will trigger 
the ‘ordinary revision procedure’ of the Treaties laid down in Article 48(2-5) TEU.33 This 
revision procedure prescribes a wholesale Convention akin to the one that prepared the EU 
Constitutional Treaty prior to a ‘normal’ intergovernmental conference. As a consequence, 
those future negotiations will probably consider a host of issues that go well beyond the 
scope of the present deal. It should also be noted that, if and when the European Council 
agrees to them, those amendments to the Treaties will only enter into force after being 
ratified by all the member states in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. As with previous rounds of treaty revision, the outcome of these processes 
cannot be guaranteed in those countries that put the treaties to the test in national referenda. 
It is highly doubtful that, at the time of his Bloomberg speech, Cameron had envisaged 
himself spearheading a process of deeper EU integration in which the UK would be only one 
of 28 equal players, weakening the claim to exceptionalism that has been central to the Prime 
Minister’s playbook. What is more, Cameron should have known that some of the EU 
reforms he demanded could only be implemented through treaty reform and that it was thus 
always going to be hard to fulfil his pledge of organising an in/out referendum before the 
end of 2017. 
A state of limbo until the referendum 
Presenting the deal to the assembled press corps in Brussels late on Friday night, David 
Cameron unapologetically chose to address himself primarily to a British audience: “I do not 
love Brussels. I love Britain.” He claimed to have achieved “the best of both worlds” and 
spoke of the EU largely as an enrichment opportunity for Britons; a body the UK could 
benefit from or ignore depending on its usefulness. His European peers – who have spent 
weeks, if not months, on these negotiations for the UK – must have swallowed hard on 
hearing the Prime Minister’s combative tone. Then again, the other leaders acted in their 
national interests too. Their hard-headed collective decision was that it would be better for 
their countries and for the EU as a whole if the UK stayed in the European Union. In the end, 
they gave Cameron what he wanted: a decent deal on narrow but nonetheless key issues. 
As such, the heads of state or government of the 28 member states closed an important 
chapter in a long story of rampant speculation about a British exit from the EU. The 
referendum of June 23rd will surely prove to be the endgame, when it is the British people 
who decide whether they want to remain in the EU or leave. In this context, one cannot 
                                                     
32 See, e.g., the Joint Communiqué – “Charting the way ahead. An EU Founding Members’ initiative on 
strengthening Cohesion in the European Union”, adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on 9 February 2016 in Rome. The text is available 
at www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2016/02/joint-communique-charting-
the-way.html. 
33 Given the extent of the proposed amendments to the Treaties, it is unlikely that the European Parliament 
would give its consent to the European Council deciding by simple majority not to convene a Convention 
pursuant to Art. 48(3), second para. TEU. 
14  WEISS & BLOCKMANS 
 
escape the feeling that the EU deal to avoid Brexit is neither a crowd pleaser not a vote 
winner.  
Prime Minister Cameron will now have to focus on the real priorities for Britain and make 
the case that its security and socio-economic interests are better served within the European 
Union rather than outside it. He can make that case, if only by referring to the vast body of 
evidence and analysis that was gathered in the Balance of Competences Review conducted 
by Whitehall itself. With a positive message about the value added and multiplier effects the 
EU provides to the UK, he ought to be able to convince a part of the 19% of the voters that 
are still undecided.34 It is more likely though, that ‘Project Fear’ will dominate his pre-
referendum campaign: the fear of the unknown. Indeed, the ‘Leave’ campaign has so far 
been unable to come up with a credible and easily understandable ‘Brexit’ scenario. 35 
Arguably, there is no better alternative to the UK’s already ‘specific status’ within the EU. A 
vote for the ‘Leave’ campaign would indeed be a leap in the dark. 
                                                     
34 For a recent poll, see http://thetim.es/1mhlIhU. 
35 See the critical analysis by M. Emerson, “The Final Brexit Question: The known Plan A to Remain, or the 
unknown Plan B to leave”, CEPS Working Document No. 418, February 2016. 
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Appendix: EPIN Members’ National Position Papers 
The papers in this appendix give the gist of the positions taken by our ‘mock negotiators’ on 
each of the four EU reform demands during the simulation exercise organised by CEPS and 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Brussels in October 2015.36 The papers were fine-tuned after our 
event and the publication of the British Prime Minister’s letter to European Council President 
Tusk on 10 November 2015. Positions have evolved in subsequent weeks and become more 
diverse. The papers contained in this appendix do not reflect the national positions taken by 
the heads of state or government at the European Council summit of 18/19 February 2016. 
Moreover, as the participants to our simulation exercise are members of think tanks affiliated 
to the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), and are not part of any government, the 
papers contained in this appendix do not ‘represent’ the official position of the governments 
concerned. Nevertheless, given the expertise, analysis and personal calculation of the 
analysts who cooperated in the project, the positions set out here are fairly close 
approximations to the actual official positions. Whereas this approximation effort has 
obvious shortcomings, it also has the advantage of presenting positions in a more direct way 
than diplomatic etiquette would normally allow. 
  
                                                     
36 The outcome of the mock European Council negotiations were laid down in ‘conclusions’ and published 
as an appendix to S. Blockmans and S. Weiss, “Will Cameron Get What He Wants? Anticipating reactions to 
Britain’s EU reform proposals”, CEPS Commentary, 29 October 2015. 
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1. Bulgaria 
Antoinette Primatarova, Programme Director, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia 
 
General attitudes 
Attitudes towards the EU in Britain and Bulgaria could not be more different. According to 
the spring 2015 Eurobarometer poll, 61% of Bulgarians tend to agree that more decisions 
should be taken at EU level, whereas 58% of Britons tend to disagree with this statement. 
Moreover, 56% of Bulgarians tend to trust the EU while 55% of Britons tend not to do so. 
Britain’s cherished budgetary rebate and opt-outs from Schengen, the eurozone, some justice 
and home affairs matters, and a desire for yet more exceptionalism are in stark contrast with 
Bulgarian fears of any changes to the functioning of the EU that might consolidate a multi-
speed Europe and doom Bulgaria to a second-class EU membership forever.  
Ordinary Bulgarians’ trust in the EU and its institutions are the reverse side of extremely low 
levels of trust in national politicians and institutions. A different rationale lies behind the 
preference of experts and politicians for more integration, yet also for more communitarian 
rather than intergovernmental solutions within the EU. In the framework of the pre-
accession preparations and of the membership negotiations, the ‘Euro-socialisation’ of 
decision-makers and politicians was mainly the result of intense contacts with the European 
Commission. The lesson learned was that Bulgaria’s interests are better served when the 
Commission is closely involved. The Commission rather than any individual member state 
was perceived to be Bulgaria’s best friend in the framework of the negotiations.  
The general Bulgarian preference for more communitarised policies is also based on the 
pragmatic assessment that intergovernmental cooperation is beneficial for big countries, 
whereas small and medium-sized countries have a better chance of voicing their concerns 
and having them heard through the communitarian approach.  
Euroscepticism is quite marginal in Bulgaria’s political landscape. Political calculations that 
it would be easy to instrumentalise traditional historical and cultural relations between 
Bulgaria and Russia for Eurosceptic purposes were proved wrong by the decreasing 
popularity of the vocal Eurosceptic party Attacka, which has a strong bias towards Putin and 
links with his regime.  
Despite their fundamentally different attitudes towards the EU and further EU integration, 
relations between Bulgaria and the UK are very good. There can be no doubt that Bulgaria 
would like the UK to remain within the EU. This has been publicly stated after high-level 
contacts in recent months that had (at least partly) British demands for EU reform on the 
agenda.  
Prime Ministers David Cameron and Boyko Borisov held a meeting on the fringes of the 25-
26 June 2015 European Council. Borisov’s press office reported afterwards that Bulgaria was 
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in favour of a strong UK in the framework of a strong EU.37 Finding solutions to the issues 
raised by the UK was considered to be of immediate importance to Bulgaria. Borisov was 
also reported to have expressed support for the completion of the single market in the areas 
of services, energy and the digital market. With regard to the sensitive migration topic, the 
Bulgarian prime minister shared his opinion that a regulation could be applied to the British 
social security system that could limit the so-called ‘benefit tourism’ in the country. 
Yet the most substantive, bilateral high-level contact on Britain’s EU reform agenda was the 
16 June 2015 meeting between the UK foreign secretary and Bulgaria’s foreign minister in 
London, the second one for Philip Hammond and Daniel Mitov in 2015. The first meeting in 
January created the impression that the UK’s concern about benefit tourism had the potential 
for controversy but it also triggered Mitov’s to publicly state that he could not imagine a 
European Union without the United Kingdom. In their joint June statement, 38  the two 
ministers showed general agreement on virtually all relevant issues on the UK’s EU reform 
agenda.  
One of the biggest UK concerns – migration – was reportedly discussed with mutual 
understanding for the two rather different national positions, such as the potential for abuse 
of the UK’s welfare system from the British perspective, and any changes that would put into 
question the free movement of people to work from the Bulgarian perspective (Bulgaria is 
not alone in considering the fourth freedom a ‘red line’). 
The two ministers agreed “on the need to develop an EU that is more competitive, 
democratically accountable and fair to all member states, whether part of the euro or not”. 
Last but not least, the two ministers expressed their governments’ commitment to 
 complete the single market in services (including financial services), digital technologies 
and energy; 
 reduce the regulatory burden on business, especially small and medium-sized 
enterprises; and 
 finalise ambitious free trade agreements, including the EU-US free trade agreement, and 
to communicate its benefits. 
David Cameron’s January 2013 pledge to hold a referendum on the UK’s EU membership 
resulted in more public debate and media reporting in Bulgaria than the effective steps 
towards the referendum in the wake of the Conservative Party’s May 2015 election victory. 
Between January and November 2015, Brexit was overshadowed in Bulgaria by the 
Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s geopolitical game concerning the South Stream pipeline project, the 
potential danger of a Grexit and finally the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean.  
                                                     
37 See Sofia News Agency, “Bulgaria Could Rely on British Support for Consolidating Regional Energy 
Security”, novinite.com, 25 June 2015 (www.novinite.com/articles/169458/Bulgaria+Could+Rely+on+ 
British+Support+for+Consolidating+Regional+Energy+Security). 
38 See “Foreign Secretary hosts Bulgarian Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov”, www.gov.uk, 16 June 2016 
(www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-hosts-bulgarian-foreign-minister-daniel-mitov). 
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Cameron’s 11 November 2015 speech was briefly mentioned by Bulgarian media but it did 
not trigger comment about what the Bulgarian official position might be. There are still no 
explicit Bulgarian views on British reform demands, except the general one that they should 
be accommodated without treaty changes – as treaty changes are perceived as opening 
Pandora’s box.  
Bulgarian and British officials meet regularly in the process of preparing for the EU trio 
presidency in 2017–18, but the British referendum is not on the agenda of these meetings. 
The UK Foreign Office has given its Bulgarian and Estonian partners assurances that the 
UK’s involvement in the EU trio will not be affected by the referendum, whatever the 
outcome might be. Bulgarian diplomats and officials do not expect to play a central role in 
the negotiations on British EU reform demands. 
Competitiveness 
The competitiveness component of British demands for EU reform seems to have support all 
over the Union and Bulgaria is no exception. The building of a European Energy Union is not 
really an issue on the British competitiveness agenda, but it is definitely an issue of vital 
Bulgarian interest, in terms of both competitiveness and security, and Bulgaria will hardly 
miss the opportunity to try to shift it up to a high priority on the broader EU reform agenda. 
It came as no surprise that a brief media report about the Cameron–Borisov meeting in June 
2015 was entitled “Bulgaria Could Rely on British Support for Consolidating Regional 
Energy Security”.39 
Sovereignty 
There is no official document stating that a ‘United States of Europe’ is the desired end state 
of European integration for Bulgaria, but there can be no doubt that Bulgaria belongs to the 
integrationist rather than the souverainiste camp in the EU. Bulgaria’s preference for more 
integration is very pragmatic and is clearly voiced with regard to profound concerns about 
energy security, guarding the EU’s external borders and coping with the refugee crisis. On 
these three issues, Bulgaria is firmly in favour of common European solutions and policies. 
Thus, Bulgaria is supporting the development of a European Energy Union, yet also the 
enforcement of Frontex and solidarity in handling the refugee crisis. With regard to the 
challenge of integrating refugees with a different culture and religion, Bulgaria has concerns 
similar to those of the Visegrad countries, but as an external border of the EU with limited 
resources it realises the benefits of addressing the guarding of borders and accommodating 
refugees at the European level. As a result of these pragmatic considerations, Bulgaria is 
positioning itself in quite a different way from both the Visegrad countries and Romania; the 
country is neither opposing the redistribution quotas nor is it trying to trade their acceptance 
for aspired accession to the Schengen area.40  
                                                     
39 See Sofia News Agency (2015), op. cit. 
40 Upon accession in 2007, Bulgaria was planning to join the Schengen area in 2011. The Commission’s 
assessment is that Bulgaria does fulfil the technical criteria for joining Schengen, but some EU member 
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The pragmatic integrationist mood in Bulgaria is the backdrop for understanding that the 
country does not have any problem with the phrase ‘ever closer union’ or trends towards 
deeper integration. While having no desire to remove the phrase from the Lisbon Treaty, 
Bulgaria can hardly be expected to object to some kind of opt-out for the UK; such a solution 
would be perceived as an issue of rhetoric rather than substance and thus as not jeopardising 
Bulgaria’s own interest in further integration.  
With regard to British demands for a greater role for national parliaments, Bulgaria cannot 
be expected either to oppose or to actively support them. The country has rather brief 
experience as an EU member state and in this short period it has been the government that 
has played the mayor role in relations with the EU. Bulgarian MPs quite often rely upon the 
MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to prepare ‘their’ positions with regard to EU policies. For 
Bulgaria, a ‘red card’ system would not imply further democratic legitimacy, but rather a 
potential danger of allowing other member states with strong parliaments to block the 
Commission’s legislative proposals. As regards an eventual ‘green card’ system, the 
Bulgarian parliament can hardly be expected to become proactive in the case of its 
introduction.  
The spectre of a two-speed Europe has haunted Bulgarians from the very beginning of the 
EU accession process. Before the EU committed itself to the fifth enlargement, several ideas 
were floated about how to integrate the Eastern European candidates sooner rather than 
later but without granting them full rights. Provisions that make Schengen and eurozone 
accession conditional upon future assessment of the new member states’ readiness are of 
course a kind of two-speed Europe, if just a temporary solution.  
Economic and monetary integration 
Bulgaria is not yet part of the eurozone, but has no opt-out on the euro like the UK and 
Denmark. Being at present a ‘euro-out’, Bulgaria has concerns about the impact of decisions 
taken exclusively by eurozone countries and would support any safeguards that guarantee 
that it would not become subject to decisions on European economic policy without being 
part of the decision-making process. Recent debates in eurozone countries about the need to 
deepen integration do revive fears in Bulgaria that the eurozone countries might embark on 
a road that could end in changing accession criteria and thus less cohesion within the EU. 
The October 2015 proposal of the Luxembourg EU presidency to consider promoting a social 
dimension in the euro area, and to introduce special meetings of the Employment, Social 
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council in a format of eurozone members, triggered 
immediate criticism from all non-eurozone member states, including Bulgaria. The 
stabilisation of eurozone countries should definitely not happen through eurozone caucusing 
and discrimination of future members. Bulgaria, as a prospective member of the eurozone, 
does not share all British concerns, but prior to membership Bulgaria will no doubt support 
                                                                                                                                                                     
states are making Schengen accession conditional upon more substantial progress within the framework of 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, which is monitoring reform of the judiciary system.  
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Cameron’s demand that “[t]axpayers in non-Euro countries should never be financially liable 
for operations to support the Eurozone as a currency”.41 
Free movement of labour 
In 2013, the British media subjected Bulgaria (and Romania) to relentless reporting of an 
expected influx of immigrants and a potential drain on the British welfare state following the 
end of free movement restrictions for the two countries on 1 January 2014. The UK 
Independence Party, in particular, fuelled the fire. This portrayal of Bulgaria in British mass 
media throughout 2013 was mirrored by angry media reporting in Bulgaria on British efforts 
to curb both the rights of Bulgarian students in the UK and the free movement of potential 
Bulgarian workers. However, reporting in 2013 never connected these concerns to 
Cameron’s aims of EU-wide reform, a renegotiation of UK membership or an in/out 
referendum. Statistics in 2014 and 2015 did not bear out British fears of a great Bulgarian and 
Romanian invasion. Bulgaria and Romania are no longer the only British concern with 
respect to migration, so it is clear that whatever the British demands are, there will not be 
exclusive targeting of Bulgarians and Romanians. Free movement of labour is a red line for 
Bulgaria as it is for all other member states, both new and old. But since the free movement 
of Bulgarian workers started as late as 1 January 2014, and there are fewer Bulgarian workers 
receiving in-work and out-of-work benefits than other Central and Eastern European 
workers (enjoying that freedom since 2004). The possible cutting of these benefits has not 
therefore become an issue for debate or negative public opinion in Bulgaria. Benefit tourism, 
as far as it exists, seems to be regarded as a problem that could easily be solved through 
reform of the UK’s social system. It thus remains up to the British to achieve reform in a way 
that would not discriminate against any EU citizens. There are no official proposals to 
postpone the free movement of labour for prospective new members of the EU until their 
economies converge more closely with those of existing member states, but given Bulgaria’s 
interest in enlargement towards the Western Balkans, Bulgaria should resist such proposals.  
  
                                                     
41 Letter of David Cameron to Donald Tusk, 10 November 2015. 
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2. Czech Republic 
Věra Řiháčková, Senior Research Fellow, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Prague 
 
Economic governance  
The Czech Republic shares the UK’s view that decision-making at the EU level needs to be 
inclusive and that the positions of non-eurozone members should also be taken into account. 
At the same time, it is necessary to bear in mind that thanks to the UK’s permanent 
exemption from the obligation to join the eurozone, it is in a different position from the 
Czech Republic. So while it is acceptable to consider certain safeguards for the UK (as a 
permanent non-eurozone member), such measures can neither be incorporated into the 
eurozone architecture nor paralyse further integration of the eurozone, because the Czech 
Republic will become a member of the eurozone sooner or later. The Czech Republic does 
not support the possibility for non-eurozone members to veto further development of the 
eurozone, i.e. through the so-called ‘emergency brake’. 
Competitiveness   
The Czech Republic understands that the UK is not requesting a renegotiation of its position 
in the EU in this area, but rather aims to raise issues that are important for the whole EU. 
Competitiveness has long been a priority for the Czech Republic (dating back to its 2009 EU 
presidency), and it considers the UK’s reform requests in this area the least controversial. At 
a general level, the Czech Republic supports the proposals that aim to deepen the single 
market, active trade policies and better regulation. The detailed position of the Czech 
Republic, however, depends on the substance of the specific proposals. It welcomes 
improvements to the current state of legislation, for example through the Better Regulation 
Agenda, and the conclusion of free trade agreements with third countries.  
Sovereignty 
The UK requests a legally binding agreement stating the UK’s exemption from the provision 
on ever closer union (among the peoples of Europe) and suggests enhancing the system for 
involving national parliaments in EU decision-making through the so-called ‘red card’. For 
the Czech Republic, the complete removal of the principle of ever closer union from the 
Treaty is not acceptable. At the same time, the Czech Republic sees any general opt-out for 
the UK from ever closer union that would require a change to EU primary law as very 
problematic, since removing the principle of ever closer union would have serious 
consequences for the overall concept of the EU. The Czech Republic awaits suggestions on 
how to tackle the issue without the need to go beyond the existing framework of EU primary 
law. The country has traditionally favoured an enhanced role for national parliaments in EU 
decision-making and supports their proactive approach and right to initiative (the so-called 
‘green card’). Yet the Czech Republic does not favour an increase of their blocking potential. 
Furthermore, such an increase in the powers of national parliaments would, in effect, mean 
that they would become another parliamentary chamber in the EU’s legislative process. Once 
22  WEISS & BLOCKMANS 
 
again, however, the Czech Republic is waiting for specific proposals on the suggested 
mechanism of the red card.  
Immigration 
Any discriminatory measures aimed at limiting the free movement of persons and the right 
to residence are unacceptable to the Czech Republic. This is the most sensitive area of the 
UK’s proposals. The Czech Republic calls for a distinction to be drawn between the free 
movement of EU citizens and that of third-country nationals, which is often conflated in the 
UK. The free movement of persons/labour – citizens of the EU – is a cornerstone of the single 
market recognised by all member states and a long-awaited achievement for the new 
member states following the seven-year transition period after the 2004 accession. The right 
to live and work anywhere in the EU is therefore important for the Czech Republic, also in 
light of its historical experience before 1989. For the majority of Czech citizens, the free 
movement of persons is the main benefit of EU membership. It is necessary to distinguish 
between measures aimed at preventing its abuse and measures limiting free movement. In 
the area of preventing abuse, the Czech Republic may support certain, very concrete 
initiatives. At the same time, it cannot support any measures limiting the social benefits of 
EU citizens who are entitled to worker status, as the non-discrimination principle is 
anchored in EU primary law.  
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3. Denmark 
Jan Høst Schmidt, Senior Advisor, Think Tank EUROPA, Copenhagen 
 
General attitudes 
The huge flows of asylum seekers and immigrants into Europe present many challenges for 
the EU and its member states. The present de facto breakdown of the Schengen Agreement 
and the Dublin Regulation poses considerable risks to fundamental EU principles, such as 
free movement and solidarity among member states. This critical period for the European 
project follows a period of poor economic performance of the EU economy and gives fresh 
impetus to popular Euroscepticism. 
In this situation, we do not need a split of the EU; rather we need to reform the EU to tackle 
the challenges. Denmark therefore wants to find constructive solutions, which at the same 
time can reform the EU and can accommodate some of Britain’s wishes for reforms, as long 
as these changes can strengthen the functioning of the EU and increase its legitimacy for EU 
citizens. 
The reforms must take place within the existing Lisbon Treaty. We would not be able to 
explain to European citizens why we are engaging in complicated discussions on treaty 
changes (with possible multiple demands for changes), which risk paralysing the EU 
institutional system right now, when we need to focus on solutions to solve the asylum and 
immigration problems and bring more growth and jobs to EU citizens. 
Denmark believes that we should be able to find solutions that will improve the functioning 
of the EU through reforms of secondary legislation and more focus on implementation of 
already agreed EU legislation, not least in the area of the single market. In some cases, we 
could work through declarations by all member states, or in very exceptional cases through 
protocols to the Treaty on behalf of the UK to be adopted by the member states according to 
their national procedures. 
Sovereignty 
Denmark subscribes to the conclusions on the concept of ever closer union of the June 2014 
European Council. The concept allows for different paths of integration for individual 
member states. Those that so wish can deepen integration in specific areas while respecting 
the wishes of those like the UK that do not want to deepen any further. The existing set-up of 
the Treaty can be applied on a case-by-case basis at the request of member states in specific 
areas. Such agreements can be settled through declarations and in some cases by specific 
protocols to the Treaty. 
For Denmark, ever closer union or more integration is not an end in itself. The EU should 
only act when there is clear added value in such action compared with what the member 
states can do on their own. The EU should be big on big things and small on small things. 
Denmark would like to look at ways to reinforce the principle of subsidiarity in practice and 
would also be willing to seriously consider possibilities to roll back existing EU legislation. 
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Denmark welcomes the European Commission’s Better Regulation Package, with its rollback 
of existing legislation in areas where the legislation is no longer fit for purpose.  
The EU is a union of member states. To ensure the democratic legitimacy of EU decisions, it 
is important to ensure the involvement of national parliaments in full respect of the Treaty 
and the roles of the Commission and the European Parliament. Denmark is in favour of 
giving national parliaments a stronger, but positive role in EU decision-making. National 
parliaments should have the possibility to comment on the Commission’s proposals, and if a 
majority of national parliaments have similar comments, Denmark would invite the 
Commission to ‘change or explain’ its policy proposals. This procedure could also apply to 
existing legislation. 
Furthermore, national parliaments may contest the compliance of draft EU legislation in line 
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This procedure is a clear, concrete, 
existing tool for national parliaments to intervene in the EU legislative process. Denmark 
welcomes the Commission’s intentions to investigate ways to strengthen this procedure and 
the involvement of national parliaments. 
Competitiveness 
The EU needs to make a more decisive contribution to increasing economic growth and job 
creation in the member states. It is an essential task for the Union even if the final 
responsibility for economic policy rests with the member states, but increased growth and 
jobs would be fundamental to EU citizens’ support for the EU. 
The single market is at the very core of the EU project. A better functioning single market 
will improve the EU’s competitiveness and the wealth of our societies. In general, we need to 
push for much better implementation of existing legislation, faster decisions on common 
standards, and a much more level playing field for businesses and consumers in the single 
market. This requires the Commission and the member states to devote more resources to 
the implementation of legislation, to competition policy, and to a quicker and better follow-
up of complaints from business and consumers. The latest suggestions from the Commission 
to improve the single market are a step in this direction, but we need a quantum leap 
forward, and only a redirection of EU and national resources to back this up will provide the 
necessary momentum. 
In the area of services, the Digital Single Market and the energy market, we need to push 
harder for faster reforms, which can bring down remaining barriers and allow for rational 
common solutions. Denmark strongly supports the Commission’s efforts to bring about 
agreement on various bilateral trade and investment agreements, not least the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership with the US. 
The Better Regulation Package proposed by the Commission is an important element in the 
process to improve competitiveness. We need improved evaluation of EU legislation, both ex 
ante and ex post, with review clauses and possibilities to roll back legislation that is no 
longer fit for purpose. 
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Economic and monetary integration 
Decisions concerning all member states, especially decisions concerning the functioning and 
the development of the single market in all its aspects, should be taken by all member states 
according to the rules of the Treaty. Member states sharing the euro as a currency may face 
specific common challenges, interests and responsibilities, which may call for the further 
integration of these member states. This need for possible deeper integration should be 
recognised by non-euro countries. 
The process towards a deeper Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), on the other hand, 
should recognise the legitimate interests of the non-euro member states. As indicated in the 
Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, the process towards 
deeper EMU is open to all member states.42 The process should be transparent and preserve 
the integrity of the single market in all its aspects. The existing Treaty provides, in 
Denmark’s view, sufficient room for finding the right balance between the interests of both 
the euro-area countries and the non-euro member states. 
Free movement of labour 
The free movement of goods, services, capital and labour are pillars of the single market. So 
is the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. Yet the Treaty recognises 
member states’ rights to lay down the fundamental principles for their national social 
security systems. Equally, EU legislation in the area of social and employment affairs should 
not jeopardise the economic balance in any national social security system, as also recognised 
in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
At this time, and for a foreseeable future, levels of income and of social welfare among 
member states in the EU differ considerably. This may lead to unintended runs on richer 
member states’ social security systems, in particular. We should therefore consider ways in 
which the right to social benefits for workers and their families can be better linked to 
residence and work for a certain period in the country in question. Secondary EU legislation 
should be clarified to that effect. 
  
                                                     
42 See the Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, by Jean-Claude 
Juncker in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and Martin Schulz, 
European Commission, Brussels, 22 June 2015. 
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4. France 
Vivien Pertusot, Head of Brussels Office, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) 
 
Competitiveness 
France supports a stronger role for the EU to encourage growth and employment. The past 
few years have indeed shown that all avenues need to be explored to restore growth to EU 
economies.  
In light of the economic crisis, the current government has acknowledged the need to 
streamline regulation. Thus, it has implemented the choc de simplification measures, which 
aim to make life easier for businesses, especially SMEs. France consequently supports the 
efforts carried out by the European Commission through its Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme (REFIT).  
France also commends the work of the European Central Bank to support the euro. France 
often emphasised that the value of the euro was too high, especially compared with that of 
the US dollar. A cheaper euro is thus good news for companies seeking to be more 
competitive on the global market.  
More growth and less unemployment are essential to a sustainable European economic and 
social model. France supports growth policies as well as structural reforms, but it also 
encourages the eurozone to increase the coordination of its members’ economic policies. It is 
becoming increasingly difficult to imagine a well-functioning eurozone without stronger 
eurozone governance. Having a eurozone-wide discussion about how to devise better 
national priorities would help the whole of the eurozone.  
It is also essential to bear in mind that structural reform and efforts to stick to European rules 
cannot be separated from discussions about Europe’s social policies. Citizens need to feel 
that the EU is not only about sticking to rules but also about preserving our social model.  
France supports the completion of the single market in energy, digital technologies and 
services, along with the Capital Markets Union. More work needs to be done to overcome 
the remaining stumbling blocks, but France is committed to moving forward.  
Trade is also an important component for growth. France supports trade agreements, but it is 
important that the EU does not degrade its high standards to bring about the signature of 
new agreements.  
Free movement of labour 
Free movement of persons is a fundamental pillar of the single market and of the EU more 
generally. France would consider it unacceptable to give away this right. 
The EU rules also allow for workers to work freely in all member states. This is an important 
right that should not be jeopardised. The concept of non-discrimination among European 
citizens is embedded in the Treaties and is a fundamental principle of the EU. France would 
not accept it being compromised.  
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At the same time, France recognises that there could be room for making sure that there are 
no abuses of social security systems in the EU. It understands that abuses could represent 
unfair additional costs to a country’s national budget, which is particularly problematic in 
times of economic crisis. For that reason, France welcomes the different rulings by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union to better delineate access to benefits by unemployed new 
migrants.  
However, France refuses to limit access to in-work benefits. This would represent 
discrimination between nationals and EU citizens.  
Sovereignty 
‘Ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ is a bedrock principle of the European 
project. It has strong historical and symbolic importance. It represents the wish to bring 
Europeans closer and away from the tragic conflicts that poisoned the continent in the first 
half of the 20th century.  
France is mindful of the European Council conclusions in June 2014 about ever closer union 
and feels that these address British concerns, as they clearly state that not all countries are 
destined to deepen integration.  
The UK’s debate on ever closer union appears slightly odd to the French, since the full 
sentence does not call for a sort of supranational state. Acceding to the UK’s demand for an 
opt-out therefore does not sound reasonable.  
Moreover, France has repeatedly stressed that it rejects cherry-picking. The UK already has a 
number of opt-outs and derogations. At some point, the question will necessarily be: 
Wwhere does it end?  
France does not see the need to explore new mechanisms for national parliaments. The 
Lisbon Treaty offers new ways for MPs to participate in the EU decision-making process. As 
these are relatively recent, it is more important to make sure that parliaments can make full 
use of such instruments first before thinking of new ones.  
Another important element would be to improve inter-parliamentary cooperation. More can 
be done to strengthen the role of COSAC43 as well as the inter-parliamentary cooperation on 
the Economic and Monetary Union, and on the Common Security and Defence Policy. These 
different forums offer interesting venues for MPs to better work with each other and 
coordinate their initiatives.  
Economic and monetary integration 
France wants to strengthen the eurozone, which is perceived as the future of the EU. The 
government is currently working on proposals to make the euro area more ambitious and 
better tailored to addressing the political and economic challenges it faces.  
                                                     
43 The Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union 
(COSAC). 
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France is therefore very cautious about any instrument that could hinder the development of 
the eurozone. While it acknowledges the UK’s concerns that the eurozone can form a de 
facto majority in the Council or in the EU’s agencies, France cannot accept the creation of 
mechanisms that could give the UK a form of veto.  
France has learned a lesson from the double majority-voting system established for the 
European Banking Authority and will be very vigilant to avoid its extension to other policies 
or institutions.  
Moreover, France considers that the Treaties already offer sufficient assurance to the UK that 
there should be no discrimination within the single market. For that reason, any legally 
binding mechanism is not necessary. France would, however, accept a restatement of what 
the Treaties already mention.  
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5. Germany 
Nicolai von Ondarza, Deputy Head EU/Europa Division, SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
Berlin 
 
General attitudes 
The German government is committed to keeping the United Kingdom within the EU, but 
not at any cost. In particular, it will resist any proposals that undermine the fundamental 
principles of the EU or that are perceived as weakening the eurozone. This is the balance that 
shapes the German reaction to all of the individual demands by the UK government. The 
German government is also opposed to any form of treaty change before 2017, but is willing 
to contemplate an agreement that predefines amendments to the primary law after that. In 
this regard, however, the German government is clear that the agreement should be solely 
about the demands of the UK and not be mixed with other issues of EU reform, including the 
eurozone. Politically, while the German government is willing to talk with the UK about its 
reform proposals, it refuses to act as a facilitator on behalf of the UK with other member 
states. 
Competitiveness 
The area of competitiveness is politically the least contentious of the four areas in which 
changes are sought. In terms of content, the majority of reform demands by the UK in this 
area are already in the work programme of the current European Commission and thus 
enjoy the support of the German government. The general aim of using EU instruments to 
help generate growth and jobs while increasing the competitiveness of EU member states is 
also strongly supported by Germany.  
There are only two caveats in the area of competitiveness. On the one hand, while the EU’s 
trade strategy, and in particular the pursuit of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), enjoys strong support from the German government, it is heavily 
contested by the German public. This dissent is reflected by some political parties; the Social 
Democratic Party, for instance, has joined in criticism of the investor protection instruments 
proposed for TTIP and already included in other EU trade agreements. If TTIP concludes 
during the negotiation period with the UK – which is unlikely but could happen if the latter 
negotiations are further extended – there could thus be resistance within parts of the German 
government. In the end, however, the German government should still support the 
conclusion of TTIP if it is possible. 
On the other hand, despite the general agreement with the UK regarding the deepening of 
the single market, there are substantial differences of interest regarding specific legislation. 
Examples of this are the German protection of its requirement for professional certifications 
in certain services sectors, which the UK criticises as hampering the free flow of services, and 
German reluctance to reform copyright in the Digital Single Market. Germany will therefore 
insist on keeping the agreement on the single market at a general level and not predefine 
elements for specific legislation. 
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Sovereignty 
The second area of demands, concerning sovereignty, is more contentious. First, the UK’s 
demand to end its obligation to participate in ‘ever closer union’ is regarded quite sceptically 
by the German government. Its support here depends on the implementation. A formal, 
individual opt-out for the UK is deemed highly dangerous to the EU, as it would open the 
door for other member states (such as Hungary or Poland) to join this opt-out, thus 
fracturing the EU. Yet there is openness to following up and strengthening the declaration by 
the European Council of June 2014 that ever closer union does not mean that all member 
states have to join all integration projects. This wording and the general application of the 
phrase are seen as both securing the integrity of the EU and meeting the UK’s demand. A 
more binding legal form for this clarification should also be acceptable to the German 
government. 
The demand for a ‘red card’ for national parliaments is not supported by Germany. Both the 
German government and the major parties in the Bundestag see the main role for national 
parliaments in the EU as that of controlling their governments; thus, they refuse to give 
national parliaments a veto on EU legislation. The main argument is that such a veto could 
hamper the already complicated decision-making process at the EU level. However, the aim 
of strengthening national parliaments does not constitute a red line, as long as the quorum 
needed for a ‘yellow card’ (that is, at least a third of national parliaments) is retained. The 
German government would be most open to an agreement with the European Commission 
that it will take all yellow cards fully into account. The German government is also sceptical 
about granting national parliaments a ‘green card’ to initiate EU legislation, as long as such a 
right of initiative is not equally granted to the European Parliament. 
Finally, the UK’s demands to have its existing opt-outs in justice and home affairs confirmed 
and to reinforce the principle of subsidiarity are acceptable to Germany. 
Economic and monetary integration 
The German government fully respects the UK’s opt-out from the common currency, but is 
very critical of any new instruments that would give non-eurozone members co-decision 
powers on eurozone matters or increase their powers in normal EU decisions. The British 
demands on economic governance are therefore highly contested by Germany, albeit to a 
different degree. 
First, concerning the call for establishing the EU as a multi-currency union, Germany regards 
the current rules of the Treaty, which grant a permanent derogation to the UK and Denmark, 
as fully sufficient, thus already establishing that it is their choice to eventually join the 
eurozone or not. Hence, there is no need to specify this in the Treaties. Additionally, it would 
open up other difficult questions, such as whether the – politically not enforced – 
commitment by other member states (for example, Poland) to eventually join the eurozone 
would be abolished.  
Second, in principle the German government is open to the notions that the integrity of the 
single market should be protected and that non-eurozone members should not be financially 
liable for operations to support individual eurozone countries. In both cases, however, the 
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implementation is crucial. Instruments such as those increasing the transparency of eurozone 
decision-making are acceptable and are worked on, while any participation of non-eurozone 
members in eurozone decision-making is not acceptable. Rules safeguarding the integrity of 
the single market should be enforced through the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
while the eurozone should retain its ability to undertake the swift decision-making that has 
been so crucial in recent years. In this sense, a clarification of the Treaties reiterating that 
decisions of the eurozone should not discriminate within the single market could be part of a 
compromise. 
Finally, from a German point of view there is still a need to clarify the UK’s proposals for 
ensuring its goal that any issues that affect all member states must be discussed and decided 
by all member states. While supporting this general principle, the German government 
rejects any instruments that would give non-eurozone countries a bigger say or reduce the 
requirements for blocking majorities within the single market, such as the introduction of a 
new ‘double majority’ or an adjustment of the so-called ‘Ioannina-bis mechanism’. This 
rejection also includes the proposals for an emergency brake that would transfer decision-
making within the single market to the European Council, thereby effectively re-introducing 
unanimous decision-making.  
Free movement of labour 
The German government welcomes the UK’s continued support for the free movement of 
people, which it considers to be one of the cornerstones of the single market and the EU. 
Within this context, Germany also supports the UK with regard to reducing the abuse of free 
movement, as long as it is proportionate and does not effectively reduce EU citizens’ right to 
free movement.  
Nevertheless, the UK’s demand to introduce a four-year transition period applying to the 
receipt of in-work benefits by EU citizens is regarded as infringing the general principle of 
non-discrimination and is thus not compatible with the single market sought by both 
Germany and the UK. There is willingness to talk with the UK and other EU partners about 
possible solutions that address the British government’s objectives without infringing the 
principles of free movement and non-discrimination, but there is currently no solution on the 
table acceptable to the German government.  
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6. Greece 
Filippa Chatzistavrou, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP, Athens 
 
Sovereignty 
The ‘ever closer union’ concept is one of the founding principles of the EU. The discussion 
thus concerns a general provision. Greece could raise significant legal and political concerns 
as far as the possibility to amend a general provision of the Treaty.  
Greece’s European policy, in particular since the 1990s, has always placed the country firmly 
in the pro-federalist camp. The outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis has spurred debates 
about European integration, especially in relation to monetary and economic integration. 
Despite the crisis, Greece would like to remain in the inner core of the EU. Regardless of the 
slight decline in public support for integration, Greece continues to be among the most pro-
integrationist countries in the EU. After five years of deep recession, a large majority of the 
political parties support further integration, especially in the following fields:  
 deepening Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (a debt mutualisation scheme, a plan 
for economic governance and new policies for redistribution);  
 setting up an EU investment policy;  
 harmonising EU immigration and asylum policies;  
 establishing a common policy on the management of external borders; and  
 strengthening the employment and social aspects of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Greece may express the fear that any exemption from ever closer union risks facilitating both 
voluntary and forced opt-outs. Amendments such as institutionalising an (individual) opt-
out mechanism or allowing member states to opt out of a general principle of the EU could 
jeopardise integration as a positive and framing process.  
Under the EU Treaties the UK enjoys significant opt-outs or discretionary opt-ins of large 
parts of policy areas. In that respect, two options seem possible. 
Instead of removing the concept of ever closer union from the preamble of the EU Treaties, 
the alternative could consist of reformulating it in a different way: creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe, provided that their respective countries decide to work 
towards even further integration. The challenge, therefore, would be to constitutionalise a 
multi-speed Europe through the generalisation of differentiated integration as a positive and 
not a negative principle. 
Another option to consider, and probably the most suitable, would be to negotiate a new 
protocol related to the UK opting out of the ever closer union. But in this case, in order to 
overcome any procedural hurdles, the protocol would have to contain provisions going into 
greater detail regarding the UK’s participation in decision-making and the consequences of 
opting out for its membership and associated benefits, including an eventual opt-out from 
some of the benefits of EU membership.  
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The political legitimacy and autonomy of the parliamentary institution is a major issue in 
Greece. One of the effects of the Greek memoranda of understanding with its creditors was 
the conversion of the Greek parliament into an executive body responsible for implementing 
decisions imposed by the EU partners/creditors. National parliamentary credibility has 
taken a hit. That is the reason why the question of whether and to what extent sovereignty 
must be transferred to the EU from its member states is becoming a central debate within the 
EU.  
Greece disagrees with the introduction of a ‘red card’. By contrast, the introduction of a 
‘green card’ is a proposal that Greece could greatly support. The Lisbon Treaty develops the 
provision on national identities, now found within Art. 4(2) of the Treaty of European Union 
(TEU). This article reminds us that the Union must respect the national identities of the 
member states, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional. In its 
new role, Art. 4(2) TEU bolsters the member states’ claim to sovereignty and the possibility 
to control aspects crucial to them.  
Consequently, a green card mechanism could contribute to restoring the relationship 
between the EU and the member states, thereby enabling the avoidance of direct 
fundamental conflicts and reflecting the concept of constitutional pluralism. A green card 
procedure could enable national parliaments to make policy suggestions and be more 
actively involved in the legislative process. This could restore the often-eroded legitimacy of 
national parliaments within the EU. This mechanism could apply in all the areas where the 
Treaties give the EU the competence to act. Greece could support this proposal provided that 
this mechanism would apply under specific conditions (a very high share of votes, strict 
deadlines, the European Parliament’s consent as a precondition, etc.). 
Nevertheless, it would be quite difficult to secure the agreement of all the member states and 
to ensure that this green card system would have real effect on the policy-making process. 
That is especially so if the idea is to copy the procedures for the ‘yellow’ and ‘orange cards’, 
which allow the European Commission to arbitrarily decide whether to maintain, amend or 
withdraw the reasoned opinions/proposals received from national parliaments. Since the 
Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments have had the right to review the compliance of proposed 
EU legislation with the subsidiarity principle through a control mechanism. So far, the 
overall picture of the implementation of these new provisions seems mixed. First, the 
subsidiarity control mechanism has been much criticised as formalistic. Second, it has been 
activated rarely, i.e. the yellow card procedure has been triggered twice, but the orange card 
procedures not at all.  
Competitiveness 
Greece could support further initiatives to strengthen the single market provided that the 
European Commission undertakes a thorough review of the digital market strategy, not only 
evaluating the competitive concerns and their dynamics in the internal and global market, 
but also the potential impact on job creation in the EU economy. Still, the UK has to be able 
to convince member states that further liberalisation could really boost EU GDP and provide 
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economic and social benefits for European workers. Actually, Greece has officially declared 
its concerns and its opposition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. 
Greece is aware of the importance of improving the efficiency of the European legislative 
process through greater transparency and openness. The Better Regulation Package came 
during a special political context for Greece. Greece experienced the growing influence of 
technocrats in political decision-making during the crisis. Indeed, there is a difference in 
perceptions between Greece and the UK on this matter. The problem for Greece is not so 
much the omnipotence of European legislation as the de-politicisation of the EU’s legislative 
process, which is exposed to the influence of technocrats and interest groups.  
Greece can share the agenda of cutting red tape and enhancing competitiveness if this new 
package is intended to remedy this situation. So the real question is if the measures proposed 
will lead to improvements in citizen involvement or will further increase experts’ 
involvement in the European legislative process, thus reducing the political power of the EU 
institutions and in fact negating the intentions of the legislator. If the basic idea of this Better 
Regulation Package really is to make the EU more democratic and to boost opportunities and 
employment in SMEs then new and related initiatives will be more than welcome.  
Energy is one of the most important sectors of the Greek economy. The privatisation of assets 
of the PPC (Greek Public Power Corporation), such as the electricity transmission network 
operator (ADMIE) and power units, has been seen as another way to bring capital to the 
government’s empty coffers. Yet according to the July 2015 agreement on the third bailout 
plan for Greece and on the energy market specifically, Greece needs to proceed with the 
privatisation of the ADMIE “unless replacement measures can be found that have equivalent 
effect on competition”.44 Greece is quite reluctant to support full liberalisation of the energy 
sector right now. Actually, according to the EU’s Third Energy Package, the bloc’s 
liberalisation framework, full ownership unbundling of the electricity assets is optional. 
Greece is ready to support a plan aimed at progressively reducing the PPC’s share, i.e. up to 
25% by 2018 and 50% by 2020. Moreover, it is trying to find replacement measures that have 
an equivalent effect on competition. Greece therefore supports the transfer of the assets of 
ADMIE into a company that is 51% controlled by the state. 
Economic and monetary integration 
Greece could agree that more emphasis should be placed on the concept of a multi-currency 
Union, where there are no first-class member states (eurozone member states) and second-
class members (countries outside the euro). It considers that Britain’s plans to create a new 
relationship with the EU can coexist with far-reaching EU Treaty changes in order to make 
the eurozone a more integrated Union (a eurozone commissioner, resource transfers and 
oversight by the European Parliament).  
Greece could also support Prime Minister David Cameron’s fairness agenda and the 
promotion of new procedural safeguards for non-eurozone members in areas of European 
economic governance under the conditions that these safeguards are really vital to the 
                                                     
44 Euro Summit Statement, SN 4070/15 Brussels, 12 July 2015. 
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integrity of the single market and that they do not pose any obstacle to greater integration 
among members of the single currency, financial market regulation or supervision. At the 
same time, nobody could ignore Britain’s prominence in the financial sector. 
But such a balance – between the needs of the wider EU single market and the requirements 
for a more integrated economic and banking union – is quite challenging from a legal and 
political point of view. A solution to satisfy the British demand could be to codify the UK’s 
specific, legally watertight safeguards in a new ‘single market protocol’ that would commit 
the EU to a proportionate regulatory regime while safeguarding the UK from decisions taken 
solely by the eurozone for the other 27 member states. But the problem here is that an 
effective British (or more generally, non-eurozone member state) veto over EU regulatory 
proposals could be resisted by eurozone member states, including Greece.  
To find a fair solution without being obliged to satisfy excessive requirements, EU member 
states could ask for a kind of new institutional safety valve for all non-eurozone countries 
and potential euro-outs. Instead of giving the UK a legal derogation for ‘special treatment’, it 
would probably be preferable to create a single market safeguard in relation to a eurozone-
driven agenda that works for all non-eurozone countries and is in favour of a more dynamic 
trade agenda while protecting the integrity of the single market.  
Nevertheless, Greece is still reluctant to consider the various procedural options currently 
under discussion, such as the application of qualified majority voting to non-eurozone 
member states, not only in one EU regulator, the European Banking Authority, but also in 
the other eurozone bodies. This reluctance also applies to the use of directives that allow for 
more national discretion in implementation while the majority of eurozone members agree 
that regulations promoting uniform enforcement are the best incentive for further enhancing 
EMU integration. Similarly, there is reluctance to consider the establishment of procedural 
mechanisms, i.e. subsidiarity tests of competence in economic policy, mechanisms 
mandating non-eurozone observer participation in all eurozone meetings or a last resort 
‘emergency brake’ through which a matter of vital national interest to a non-eurozone 
member state could be discussed at the European Council. 
Free movement of labour 
Greece will be very reluctant to accept limitations to intra-EU labour mobility for EU 
member state nationals. Given the huge increase in unemployment in Greece, these kinds of 
restrictions could create ‘social embargos’ and cause political turbulence, especially in the 
countries of southern Europe suffering from the economic crisis. The intra-EU labour 
mobility for EU member state nationals is one of the cornerstones of the EU, a fundamental 
value of European solidarity. According to Art. 151 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), the Union and the member states, having in mind fundamental 
social rights such as those enshrined in the European Social Charter and in the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their objectives the 
promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions. This is to allow for 
their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, along with adequate social 
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protection, social dialogue and the development of human resources for lasting high 
employment and to combat exclusion. 
Of course, recent EU law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
determine rights to permanent residence and social benefits for non-active EU migrant 
workers, leading to a new observation that the Court accepts the existence of a category of 
EU citizens who enjoy a right of residence but have no access to minimum subsistence 
benefits. Greece considers that giving national authorities carte blanche to refuse any claim 
to social assistance by indigent EU citizens could constitute a negative turning point for 
Europe and may have worrying implications for the division of competences between 
national immigration and welfare authorities. 
As one of the most pro-integrationist countries, Greece would be firmly opposed to 
individual opt-outs from the social acquis, the scope of which is already very limited. Instead 
of intensifying social welfare competition among EU countries, Greece is in favour of 
introducing new labour standards and reinforcing labour market institutions in order to 
bridge the social divisions exacerbated by the crisis and to fight against poverty and social 
exclusion. This implies establishing a social fund to aid displaced workers and strengthening 
social policy cooperation among member states, including the general goal of promoting 
improvements in the living and working conditions of workers so that an upward levelling 
will occur. 
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7. Ireland 
Andrew Gilmore, Senior Researcher, Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin 
 
Competitiveness 
We must begin by noting that Ireland and the UK share a mutually beneficial trading 
partnership. About €1 billion worth of goods and services are traded between our two 
countries every week, and this is far from one-directional trade: in fact, the UK exports more 
to Ireland than it does to China, India and Brazil combined. We are the UK’s fifth largest 
market, and more than £14 billion pounds worth of British goods and services were exported 
to Ireland in 2012.  
Thus, Ireland and the UK have a mutual interest in issues of trade, competitiveness and 
removing barriers to business. Addressing the competitive disparity that has grown between 
Europe and other parts of the world is a priority issue, and we are pleased to see synergy 
between the European, Irish and British agendas on this topic. 
Ireland expects to be a net beneficiary of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
once it is completed, and for that reason strongly supports bringing the deal to a conclusion, 
and welcomes the Council’s statements in this respect.  
Completing the single market is also of importance to Ireland, and we furthermore believe 
this to be in the interests of all 28 member states. The digital economy in particular is a vital 
aspect of the Irish economy, and is considered an important factor in the country’s post-crisis 
recovery. Ireland has in recent years positioned itself as a point-of-entry into the EU market 
for US multinationals in this sphere, and we also hope to foster and promote home-grown 
digital start-ups.  
A lack of regulatory harmonisation has hindered growth in the digital economy across 
Europe, and artificially distorted the market in favour of competing regions. Completing the 
Digital Single Market, then, is of special interest to Ireland, and we welcome initiatives in 
this regard. The recent decision to end roaming charges is an encouraging development, and 
we urge further progress in the coming months. 
In Ireland, where SMEs have struggled since the crisis, there is a degree of sympathy for the 
UK’s quest for EU reforms to boost competitiveness. The Irish view of this is again greatly 
shaped by its recent experiences, and it is felt that the removal of any impediments to 
economic recovery will be welcome.  
However, Irish support in this area comes with a caveat. Our UK partners have had a 
tendency to view the EU as little more than an embellished free trade zone, but it is 
important in this debate to understand that there is a difference between a free trade area 
and a single market. It must be noted that the latter market requires institutionalised and 
legal means to enforce fair competition rules, and to prevent competitive distortions, and this 
cannot and should not be confused with red tape. If national governments or parliaments 
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have the power to undermine these rules, then the single market disintegrates and 
protectionism inevitably takes its place.  
As a small state in a large union, Ireland is keen to ensure that provisions relating to fair 
competition in particular are not undermined by any reform initiatives.  
Thus, Ireland is supportive of removing barriers to competitiveness, but hopes that it will be 
recognised that there are reasonable limits to the extent to which ‘red tape’ can be 
minimised. 
Free movement of labour 
The migration issue is one of common concern for the member states. Depending on the 
state, however, it is clear that it raises profoundly different and difficult political and social 
interests, including those surrounding free movement of peoples in the single market – the 
foundation of mobility within the EU, and arguably the Union’s greatest achievement and 
contemporary justification for its citizens. 
As Charles Flanagan, our foreign minister, recently stated, we understand that the scale of 
migration into the UK, including from other member states, is a source of concern, both for 
the UK government and for many British people. Ireland also understands that this is 
contributing to a sense of dissatisfaction with the EU and with Britain’s place in that Union. 
Ireland itself has benefited greatly from the principle of free movement, particularly since the 
economic crisis. The country furthermore has a long history of emigration, which in turn has 
lent it an understanding and empathy for the plight of economic migrants.  
From the Irish perspective, the very perception of the citizens of certain member states being 
treated differently from others touches a nerve deep within the EU’s common ethos, and in 
crafting a solution to this issue it is necessary to ensure that the Treaty provisions on non-
discrimination are adhered to. Provided this core principle can be respected, Ireland will be 
cautiously open to proposals on this topic. 
Ireland welcomes recent judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union, clarifying 
the competencies of the member states with respect to non-active claimants of social 
assistance, but further constructive engagement on the issues raised by the UK is 
encouraged.  
In particular, proposals to address specific abuses of the system, such as welfare fraud and 
sham marriages, as suggested by Prime Minister David Cameron, would be acceptable from 
the Irish perspective. Ireland would also support reasonable measures to enhance provisions 
for the deportation of migrants convicted of welfare fraud, and restricting re-entry rights for 
the same. These are areas of common concern for the member states and can be addressed 
with relative ease, through a comprehensive review and amendment, where necessary, of 
existing legislation at both the national and European level. 
On the topic of social assistance to job seekers and non-resident dependants, it is noted that 
the member states are already granted a degree of discretion in this regard, but a further 
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review of the legislation with a view to obtaining a mutually acceptable solution is 
encouraged. 
Mr Cameron has also raised concerns in his letter regarding strengthening powers for 
deportation and re-entry bans for criminal migrants. This, again, is an area of common 
concern, and one that it is felt should be addressed by the member states. 
Sovereignty 
Ireland welcomes the reaffirmation of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, as 
well as reasonable initiatives to strengthen this principle, and furthermore notes the synergy 
on this issue with the mandate of First Vice President Frans Timmermans.  
Ireland is also sympathetic towards demands to tackle what some have termed the 
‘democratic deficit’ in the EU.  
With respect to the ‘red card’ proposal, however, Ireland would caution against a situation in 
which relatively small groups of national parliaments would be granted power to reverse or 
veto EU legislation, as has been suggested. Not only would such a move likely require a 
treaty change, which would in turn force a referendum in Ireland, but it would also reverse 
the process of integration over the past six decades, re-introduce full-scale 
intergovernmentalism, and undermine the EU legal order. Ireland cannot support the red 
card option in this format, and would urge that alternate options be considered. 
It is noted that the Lisbon Treaty already provides for enhanced scrutiny of EU legislation by 
national parliaments through the ‘yellow card’ delaying tactic. Furthermore, the ‘orange 
card’ system provides for a proposal to be voted down by the co-legislators, should a simple 
majority of national parliaments raise an objection (and should the European Commission 
decide to maintain its proposal in the face of this majority). As noted in Council conclusions, 
however, these powers have rarely been exercised. This procedure could potentially be 
strengthened without a treaty change. Ireland would welcome a removal of impediments to 
the effective deployment of this procedure.  
If these impediments were to be removed, perhaps through a strengthening of the role of 
COSAC in warning against unacceptable legislation and in coordinating responses from 
national parliaments, this would facilitate the deployment of the yellow/orange card 
procedures. Situations could therefore be foreseen in which a more significant majority of 
national parliaments might raise an objection to a proposal. Such a majority would inevitably 
influence the Commission’s decision to withdraw a proposal, or failing this, for the co-
legislators to vote it down. Thus, a de facto red card system would be in operation. 
The initiatives described in the Council conclusions would, in our view, be sufficient to 
strengthen the role of national parliaments in the European legislative process. Nonetheless, 
Ireland would be willing to entertain further suggestions to improve the interactions 
between national parliaments and European institutions, provided they fall within the 
parameters of the Treaty. 
With respect to ‘ever closer union’, it is necessary to begin with a clarification, as the phrase 
has conjured up numerous political and academic debates on the nature, purpose and 
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objective of European integration. For intergovernmentalists and Eurosceptics it denotes a 
federalist vision, but from the Irish perspective it is regarded more as a process of social and 
institutional change that does not in itself require the creating of a single federal state to 
achieve its objectives.  
Furthermore, the phrase is clearly not used about states. It is at its core a normative principle 
describing a peace-building process, not an attempt to build a superstate. (This is hardly 
surprising, given that it was first coined just ten years after the Second World War.) 
We understand the UK’s concerns, but would recall the June 2014 Council conclusions in 
which the member states noted that the concept of ‘ever closer union’ already allows for 
different paths of integration for different countries, allowing those that want to deepen 
integration to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those that do not want to deepen 
any further to stay behind.  
Although it has been made clear by the UK that this statement is insufficient in and of itself, 
Ireland feels that the wording might form an apt framework for a clarifying protocol in 
future, perhaps attached to a future accession treaty (Ireland’s own experiences of seeking 
clarifying protocols to EU Treaties as a means of addressing domestic political issues would 
be an example of such a process).  
Ireland is willing to support such an endeavour, and recognises that the concept variously 
described as ‘variable geometry’ and ‘differential integration’ has always existed to some 
extent in Europe. Though there is a justifiable wariness of formalising this concept in the EU 
Treaties, for Ireland the key issue is that the process of integration be permitted to continue 
as the member states see fit, and that no one state should be permitted to block this process. 
If a protocol could be devised that would freeze the membership rights and obligations of 
the UK in the form currently incorporated in the Treaties, without prejudice to the other 27, 
this would be a satisfactory conclusion for Ireland. 
Economic and monetary integration 
Ireland has a deep interest in defining new rules for relations between euro and non-euro 
members, primarily because these relations directly affect Northern Ireland and Irish 
relations with Britain. Disruptive fluctuations in the euro–sterling exchange rate have 
generated serious problems for Irish policy-makers. But they are even more serious for cross-
border trade, where the relatively small, mainly indigenous firms are less able to insulate 
their activities. Any further disintegration of links between the eurozone and the UK would 
be highly undesirable from an Irish perspective. 
It is felt that Mr Cameron’s demands in this area – including recognising the multi-currency 
union, preventing competitive distortions between the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ resulting from 
eurozone membership, and protecting the integrity of the single market – are not 
unreasonable, particularly in light of the UK’s status as the largest of the ‘out’ countries, and 
the home of the financial capital of Europe.  
Other demands, such as voluntary participation in eurozone initiatives, have in some cases 
previously been addressed. Ireland notes that during the creation of the Banking Union, 
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allowances were made for voluntary participation in the initiative, and the European 
Banking Authority’s ‘double majority’ voting system created a working precedent to 
accommodate concerns of eurozone caucusing.  
In all, it appears that many of these proposals can be addressed without immediate recourse 
to a treaty change, and we note that Mr Cameron has asked for ‘recognition’ of these matters. 
Ireland would suggest that this latter point could be a framework for an immediate solution 
to a number of the points listed, with a commitment to revisit others at a later date. 
Nonetheless, it is inevitable that the deepening integration of the eurozone will eventually 
require an institutional rethink to durably manage relations between the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’. 
Since it is clear that the UK will not join the euro, and that other member states are of a 
similar mind, it is therefore important that this relationship eventually be formalised on a 
permanent basis.  
Though it will require much institutional ingenuity to devise a formula whereby being 
outside the euro is compatible with being inside the EU and the single market, it is felt that 
this should be addressed fully at a later date, and we urge the Council to commit to this 
process in the future. 
  
42  WEISS & BLOCKMANS 
 
8. Italy 
Eleonora Poli, Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome 
 
General attitudes 
Although there has been a rise in the level of Euroscepticism (35% of Italians believe that 
Italy would be better off outside the EU, 3% more than in 2013),45 contrary to the UK’s stance 
the Italian government is determined to further and deepen the EU integration process 
towards a ‘United States of Europe’. In a document presented in May 2015 to the Council on 
‘Completing and strengthening the EMU’, the Italian government called for greater 
integration of fiscal, structural, social and monetary policies. 46 In particular, Italy supports 
the development of fiscal integration and cross-country transfers financed by a common 
fiscal capacity. This would provide member countries with “the means to smooth demand in 
[the] presence of negative shocks, avoid a too-restrictive overall fiscal stance and minimise 
negative spillovers”.47 
Italy also endorses the development of a common financial policy through the Banking 
Union and the implementation of a common backstop and a single deposit guarantee 
scheme. Indeed, a common financial policy would facilitate the flow of credit to the real 
economy, maintain confidence in the markets by limiting fragmentation and make the 
monetary union stronger.  
Moreover, the Italian government supports the development of a single foreign and security 
policy as well as defence policy with the aim of stabilising European borders and meeting 
current geopolitical challenges.48 In this respect, current Prime Minister Matteo Renzi is an 
advocate of a Common European Asylum System and the development of coordinated 
strategies to face the immigration crisis.49  
Given these premises, it is evident that the Italian government should be against the general 
possibility of individual opt-outs from the Union. Nevertheless, in order to avoid a Brexit 
and its potential political, economic and social effects, Italy could back some of the UK’s 
requests. Politically, it would create a precedent that could be used by national Eurosceptic 
parties or movements to ask the government to negotiate a revised EU membership. To date, 
the Five Star Movement and Lega Nord have already been campaigning to secure a 
referendum on the euro.  
                                                     
45  See “Public Opinion in the European Union”, Standard Eurobarometer 83, Fieldwork: Spring 2015, 
European Commission, Brussels, July 2015 (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/ 
eb83_publ_fr.pdf).  
46 See http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2015/05/ITALIAN-CONTRIBUTION-EMU-REFORM-.pdf 
47 Ibid. 
48 See www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/20150604Pinotti_audizione_libro_bianco.aspx 
49 See www.governo.it/backoffice/allegati/78558-10166.pdf  
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Economically, a Brexit has the potential to affect trade relations with Italy. Since 2014, Italian 
exports to the UK have grown 9.4%, reaching a value of €9 billion. Socially, a British exit 
from the EU could negatively affect the conditions of Italians moving to the UK, as Britain 
might ask for a revision of the Schengen arrangements in a way that would limit intra-
European migration. According to the Office for National Statistics, in 2014 there were 
150,000 Italians living in the UK. In 2015, 57,600 Italians registered for UK national insurance 
numbers, which was 37% more than in 2014. 
Economic and monetary integration 
Apart from the detrimental effects of a British opt-out from the Union, in line with the model 
of concentric circles, the Italian government might grant the UK some of its requests in order 
to avoid creating an obstacle to the European integration process itself. Indeed, a concentric 
model would allow the countries that push for greater political and economic integration to 
do so, without undermining those that are sceptical about further integration. Yet the latter 
should not be in a position to prevent greater unity at the core.  
In this respect, Italy might well agree to the creation of new safeguards for non-eurozone 
members in the areas of European economic policy as long as these do not undermine the 
EMU and do not result in vetoes of eurozone policy choices. The Italian government has 
maintained that “the EMU is a key element of the European construction and its integrity 
and potential to deliver shared benefits should be further safeguarded”.50 
Competiveness 
Moreover, in line with the UK’s demand to make Europe more competitive and less 
bureaucratic and to promote more transparent and democratic EU governance, Italy 
supports a Capital Markets Union. This has the potential to boost the efficient cross-border 
allocation of capital throughout all member states and to diversify sources of financing, 
especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), to the great advantage of the single 
market. Still, Italy believes that further integration in other economic sectors, such as 
services, and the development of European initiatives for SMEs and the Digital Single 
Market would be key to fostering long-term economic productivity and general welfare.51  
Italy also favours the European Commission’s Better Regulation Package. The quality of 
regulation is crucial to boosting competitiveness and economic development, as well as an 
essential condition to facilitate the exercise of the fundamental rights of citizenship.52  
Unlike the UK, however, Italy calls for a stronger European role in providing detailed 
directives or in increasing the use of regulations (or both).53 Indeed, when transposing EU 
                                                     
50 See http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2015/05/ITALIAN-CONTRIBUTION-EMU-REFORM-.pdf 
51  See ISTAT, Rapporto Annuale 2015, La situazione del Paese, Rome, p. 114 
(www.istat.it/it/files/2015/05/Rapporto-Annuale-2015.pdf). 
52  See http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/stenografici/pdf/59/indag/ 
c59_semplificazione/2014/03/03/leg.17.stencomm.data20140303.P1.com59.indag.c59_semplificazione.0024
.pdf  
53 Ibid. 
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directives into national legislation, countries might introduce specifications or additional 
rules (the so-called ‘gold-plating’ phenomenon) that may go well beyond EU requirements 
and potentially undermine the impact of European policies among member states.  
Sovereignty 
The Italian government is not in favour of removing the ‘ever closer union’ clause in the 
Treaty or any other clause referring to European fundamental principles that could 
jeopardise further integration. In the same vein, Italy does not support the introduction of 
caps or limitations on intra-EU migration in a way that would undermine the “freedom of 
movement for workers” (Art. 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), or 
opt-outs from the EU’s employment acquis. According to Prime Minister Renzi, the EU will 
become “a real union” only when employment policies are uniform across member 
countries. Apart from affecting the integration process, such reforms would also limit 
workers’ freedom to move. In this line, the May 2015 governmental document on 
“Completing and Strengthening the EMU” argues that far-reaching common initiatives are 
needed to reduce unemployment rates and facilitate adjustments that are taking place in 
European labour markets. 54  For instance, Italy supports the creation of common 
unemployment insurance as a form of risk-sharing among member states to counter the 
perverse effects of fluctuations in the economic cycle.  
Similarly, the Italian government will not support the introduction of procedures that might 
undermine the European decision-making process or the effectiveness of EU institutions. For 
instance, although Italy calls for a more active role for national parliaments in the European 
decision-making process, it does not endorse the UK’s proposal for introducing a ‘red card’ 
mechanism whereby national parliaments could block the Commission’s proposals. Nor is it 
in favour of introducing a ‘green card’ mechanism to allow national parliaments to make 
proactive contributions to EU legislation. Such a mechanism would alter the balance between 
the European Parliament and national parliaments, fragment the European decision-making 
process by forcing the Commission to evaluate initiatives advanced by a national parliament 
or group of parliaments, and encourage intergovernmental agreements to promote national 
interests instead of common ones.  
To sum up, although there are not many political areas in which Italy is aligned with Britain, 
and even when it comes to fostering competitiveness and better regulation Italy believes that 
the EU should play a central role, EU member countries should grant Britain some of its 
requests. As stated time and again by Prime Minister Renzi, there cannot be an EU without 
the UK. Hence, the Union should move towards a model of concentric circles, which would 
allow the countries wishing to achieve greater political and economic integration to do so, 
without being blocked by more sceptical member states.  
                                                     
54 See http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2015/05/ITALIAN-CONTRIBUTION-EMU-REFORM-.pdf 
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9. Poland 
Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka, Senior Research Fellow, Polish Institute of International Affairs 
(PISM), Warsaw 
 
Competitiveness 
The EU single market, which is the cornerstone of the EU, needs revitalisation and more 
integrity. To boost the EU’s competitiveness, improve the business environment and spur 
innovation, the EU needs more integration in the area of services. This is why Poland 
welcomes all actions facilitating free movement of services, which benefit both service 
providers and receivers and generate more high-quality jobs.  
In particular, Poland strongly backs an ambitious approach to the completion of the Digital 
Single Market, a key driver of innovation. It views this area as important for strengthening 
the EU’s global position, which has been undermined by the recent economic crisis. Yet, 
when designing digital market initiatives, the EU must take into consideration that their 
benefits should be spread as equally as possible to generate inclusive growth in all regions of 
the EU. 
Poland is also willing to support further integration in the area of finance, namely the 
creation of the Capital Markets Union, which would facilitate cross-border investment. It is, 
however, important that the proposed initiatives take into account the specific conditions of 
local markets and do not lead to excessive burdens on those participants operating locally. In 
this respect, it is necessary to find the right balance between the security of the financial 
system and the interests of individual member states (including the financial stability of local 
markets).  
A competitive EU single market cannot operate without a robust and integrated energy 
market. That is why Poland sees the completion of the Energy Union and implementation of 
the Third Energy Package as priority projects. Poland also stresses that EU initiatives in the 
areas of energy and climate policy should be carried out in close connection with improving 
industrial competitiveness and protecting jobs. In this regard, Poland holds the view that 
each member state should be able to determine its own energy mix within reasonable EU 
emission targets. 
Poland welcomes the European Commission’s Better Regulation Package as an effort to 
reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens for businesses. It especially favours the improved 
methodology of conducting EU impact assessments for new policy proposals, including the 
competitiveness tests for small and medium-sized enterprises. Yet in order to ensure that 
new legislative proposals do not incur asymmetric costs, not only for states and economic 
sectors but also for different regions and regional development, Poland also recommends 
that a territorial impact assessment be carried out as an integral part of the Commission’s 
impact assessment procedure.  
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Free movement of labour 
The EU single market is based on four interdependent and mutually reinforcing freedoms 
that work well only when treated as a whole package. The free movement of persons is an 
integral and inextricable element. For this reason, Poland strongly objects to the possibility of 
introducing any limitations on intra-EU migration other than those mentioned in the 
Treaties. Apart from the fact that such limitations would require an undesired and 
unpredictable process of treaty changes, they could also call into question the principle of 
equal treatment in the EU without barriers, free from stereotypes and intolerance. Some of 
the concerns linked with abuse of the welfare provision systems by immigrants are 
exaggerated or rooted in areas other than the freedom of movement. The right to take up 
employment abroad should be distinguished from the issue of receiving welfare benefits, a 
discussion that lies in the competences of national authorities and could be tackled 
separately. Additionally, Poland reiterates that the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union declares that EU member states have the possibility to deny social 
benefits to economically inactive EU citizens who moved to another country for the purpose 
of claiming welfare.  
In a similar vein, Poland does not agree that individual member states should be able to opt 
out of parts of the EU employment acquis, such as the directives on working time and 
temporary agency work. Such opt-outs would constitute a dangerous precedent with 
consequences for the entire European integration project, triggering pleas for special 
treatment in various policy sectors by other member states. The current status quo in the 
employment acquis allows for a good balance between the EU and member state 
competences with individual opt-outs in specific cases. Poland certainly agrees with the UK 
that EU regulations must be planned with respect to different particularities, tailored to the 
needs of the member states and addressed with a better regulation agenda, but these 
conditions should not translate into an acceptance of new opt-outs.  
Sovereignty 
The integrity and ambitious policy-making capacity of the EU lies in its unique institutional 
structure and decision-making, which is based on a mixture of intergovernmental and 
Community methods accompanied by a strongly guarded principle of subsidiarity. Poland is 
of the opinion that the EU should continue to be a sui generis hybrid structure geared 
towards advancing the interests of its member states. While in areas such as the single 
market or some aspects of foreign and security policy further pooling of sovereignty is 
desirable and will benefit the member states and the EU, some strategic competences should 
always remain at the national level.  
As reiterated in the June 2014 European Council conclusions, the concept of ‘ever closer 
union’ allows the different member states to take various approaches to integration and 
provides for the wishes of some member states, such as the UK, to opt-out of common EU 
policies. Although the phrase is to a large extent symbolic, Poland understands the wish of 
the UK to opt out from the concept of ever closer union, understood as an obligation to 
adhere to and implement policies that might be detrimental to its national interest and 
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disregard domestic specificities. For this reason, Poland welcomes further clarification of the 
application of ever closer union in general and is open to further discussing the British 
position in this regard.  
At the same time, with the aim of increasing the democratic legitimacy of the EU, Poland 
supports the request to strengthen national parliaments in EU policy-making. One of the 
ways to achieve this is to encourage improvements to the ‘yellow’ and ‘orange card’ 
procedures – especially in the way EU institutions address the concerns of national 
parliaments. Poland is also open to discussing potential ways of granting national 
parliaments a possibility to effectively block EU legislation (with a ‘red card’) – if there is a 
significant support base for it among the parliamentary chambers. Finally, Poland supports 
establishing a ‘green card’ mechanism based on the existing political dialogue between the 
European Commission and national parliaments, as long as its creation would be compatible 
with the current Treaty framework and constitutional regulations in the member states.  
Economic and monetary integration 
Although Poland is obliged to become a member of the eurozone, the time frame for 
potential eurozone membership has still not been determined. The recent financial and 
economic crises have revealed many weaknesses and imperfections of the eurozone – 
thereby discouraging potential members from joining the club. That is why the eurozone 
requires further reforms to become attractive enough for countries like Poland that have 
managed to secure stable economic growth over the last few years to join the club. Poland 
positively assesses the ambitious approach to reforming the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) presented in the Five Presidents’ Report. More importantly, it welcomes the report’s 
commitment to an open and transparent process of EMU reform, taking into account the 
interests of all EU member states.  
Along with the UK, Poland would like the EMU decision-making mechanisms in the field of 
European economic policy to be sufficiently inclusive and respect the legitimate interests of 
non-euro member states. Poland is therefore open to considering potential forms of ensuring 
that such principles are observed, but thinks that prompt improvement of the EMU 
architecture by simplifying and fine-tuning its existing governance framework should be the 
top priority for all EU member states. 
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10. Slovakia 
Patrik Kovać, Project Coordinator, Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), Bratislava 
 
General attitudes 
The United Kingdom has been an important partner in Slovakia’s dealings with the EU. 
London strongly supported the EU accession of post-communist states and ranked 
consistently among the top three foreign investors in Slovakia. Its decision to open the 
country’s labour market to new member states in May 2004 underlined this image of 
friendliness. Britain also played an important role in the launch of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, which helped structure new political relations between Slovakia and 
its biggest neighbour, Ukraine. 
Despite recent intra-EU clashes over the refugee crisis, Slovakia’s consistent goal has been to 
consolidate its place in the Union’s political core and to help preserve the EU’s broader 
political cohesion against the backdrop of its growing problems. A Brexit could therefore 
challenge Slovakia’s preferred direction for the EU as much as it could undermine the 
strength of the EU’s liberal economic voice. 
Sovereignty 
As for the UK’s proposal to remove or opt out of the phrase ‘ever closer union’, which is in 
the preamble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), under certain circumstances Slovakia 
is willing to support the UK, yet it is important to note that such a change would require 
reopening the EU Treaties, which Slovakia is against. For a start, removing such a phrase 
from the preamble must be considered very carefully, as it might be seen as a first backward 
step in the process of European integration. It must therefore be stated clearly that such a 
change will not harm the integration ambitions of other EU member states. In addition, it is 
important to note that the preamble of the TEU speaks of an ‘ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’, so argumentation that it leads to further institutional integration is 
disputable. Slovakia supports the idea of a multi-track Europe that allows those countries 
that want to deepen integration to move ahead while respecting the wish of others (such as 
the UK) that do not, providing this does not lead to permanent dividing lines within the EU. 
Slovakia has consistently argued against opening up the EU Treaties, which could further 
weaken the EU’s cohesion. At the same time, Slovakia welcomes additional strengthening of 
the role of national parliaments in EU policy-making in order to support the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. In evaluating the available mechanisms of ‘yellow’ and 
‘orange cards’, we need to admit that due to a lack of resources and human capital in the 
country’s legislative body, it is quite improbable that the suggested procedures for a ‘green’ 
or ‘red card’ would significantly strengthen the role of the national parliament or the 
transparency and legitimacy of EU decisions in Slovakia. Hence, Slovakia welcomes the idea 
of encouraging the European Commission to investigate how to strengthen and make more 
THE EU DEAL TO AVOID BREXIT: TAKE IT OR LEAVE  49 
 
efficient the mechanisms that are already recognised in the recent institutional framework of 
the EU Treaties, instead of introducing new procedures through a treaty change. 
Competitiveness 
Recalling the principles and conclusions adopted during previous European Council 
meetings, Slovakia supports agreement on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership with the US, a trade and investment agreement with Japan and exploring further 
possibilities for cooperation with other countries, e.g. China. Slovakia is a strong proponent 
of completing the single market, especially in the areas of services, the digital agenda, capital 
markets and energy. 
In the upcoming trio presidency, Slovakia, together with Malta and the Netherlands, wishes 
to take forward initiatives aimed at reducing the cost of non-Europe while strengthening EU 
standards. Furthermore, it welcomes the European Commission’s Better Regulation Package 
of May 2015, which aims to remove unnecessary burdens and costs for businesses. 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that it should be fully implemented at both the member 
state and EU level.  
Economic and monetary integration 
Slovakia is fully aware of the concerns expressed by the UK and other non-eurozone 
members and understands that there is a need for future reform within the eurozone. It is 
crucial to prevent the creation of permanent dividing lines among eurozone members and 
countries aspiring to use the common European currency. While not currently on the 
agenda, future enlargement of the eurozone to Visegrad neighbours is especially in 
Slovakia’s strategic and economic interest. 
As for concrete measures, new rules on how to protect non-eurozone members should be 
introduced; however, while all possibilities need to be carefully explored and analysed, non-
member states should not be able to veto internal decisions of the eurozone. 
Free movement of labour 
We need to differentiate carefully between internal and external EU migration and address 
these issues separately. In any case, the problem of external migration and the refugee crisis 
cannot be addressed by imposing any restrictions on internal EU migration, which would be 
strongly against the principles of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, free 
movement of labour and equal treatment in the EU. Slovakia does not want to undermine 
free movement of labour across the Union. With a six-digit number of Slovak workers in the 
UK, any future deal on labour migration must ensure that a family from Slovakia living and 
working in London is entitled to the same benefits and rights as a similar Dutch or Scottish 
family. Slovakia is strongly against introducing any new limitations on internal EU 
migration – a strict red line for the country in the upcoming negotiations.  
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11. Spain 
Salvador Llaudes, Research Assistant, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid 
 
Economic and monetary integration 
If the economic crisis (and the refugee crisis) has shown anything it is that the problem of the 
EU has been one of insufficient integration. Spain shows a clear commitment to further 
integration in the EU, in both economic and political terms. 
Spain could agree with the creation of safeguards for non-euro member states as long as two 
factors are considered: i) that these would not interfere with the ongoing process of more 
integration within the eurozone; and ii) that they would not adversely affect agility in the 
decision-making process. A clear requirement for Spain in this area of negotiation would be 
recognition that the euro is the currency of the EU. 
Competitiveness 
Strengthening the single market is a key concern for Spain, as the main goal of the EU at this 
stage is to regain citizens’ trust, which can only be achieved by creating jobs and promoting 
growth. Spain broadly shares the view that the single market is one of the most important 
achievements of the EU, and in that spirit any measure that seeks to deepen it is generally 
well received. 
Spain supports the strengthening of the single market in all its areas, including services, 
finance and trade (particularly the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, but also other partnerships). The current government is especially ready to 
work with the UK in this respect, as reflected in a recent joint op-ed by the two prime 
ministers, Mariano Rajoy and David Cameron, in a Spanish economic newspaper. 55 
Lowering costs for enterprises and focusing on boosting competitiveness in both countries 
and in the EU as a whole is a shared objective. 
The Energy Union is also of crucial interest, with a clear focus on the interconnections 
between Spain (and Portugal) and the rest of Europe. The Digital Single Market is another 
cornerstone for Spain. 
In addition, Spain welcomes the European Commission’s Better Regulation Package of May 
2015. It is a good basis from which to continue work on removing unnecessary burdens and 
costs for businesses. 
Sovereignty 
For Spain, the EU project is a vital one. It is even part of its national project, and has been so 
for the last three decades. Spain’s European vision was even present during Franco’s regime 
and has been reinforced with the democratic transition of the country. 
                                                     
55 Mariano Rajoy and David Cameron, “Por una Europa más competitive”, Expansión, 4 September 2015. 
See www.expansion.com/opinion/2015/09/04/55e8ad05268e3e75308b459f.html 
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There is no conceivable way in which Spain would change its pro-integrationist stance 
towards the EU. All the major parties in the country share this approach, which is also 
accepted by a majority of its citizens (although some criticism of the European project has 
arisen as a result of an excessive focus on austerity measures in the last few years). 
Spain supports a clear deepening of the process of economic and political integration. This 
process must benefit European citizens and make their lives better in three ways: 
economically, socially and as regards territorial cohesion. The aforementioned process must 
also guarantee the irreversibility of the euro, focus on the competitiveness of the internal 
market and the economy as a whole, and it must reinforce Europe as a global actor in order 
to secure its influence and role in the world. 
Spain is in favour of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and would not 
support the removal of this phrase from the preamble of the Treaty on European Union. In 
any case that would require unanimity, which carries a huge political risk. 
Nevertheless, and considering that other EU member states do not share this approach, 
Spain would be able to accept a flexible, multi-speed Europe, with different paths of 
integration for different countries, which in practice already exists. Specifically, in the case of 
the UK, it currently has four opt-outs in relation to Economic and Monetary Union, the 
Schengen Agreement, justice and home affairs, and human rights.  
Spain would therefore not oppose the UK’s will to opt out from ever closer union. This could 
ultimately be resolved through the addition of a protocol in the next round of treaty changes. 
Visions and national interests can be different among member states and Spain supports 
negotiation and dialogue. 
Spain is also firmly committed to respect of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, which the EU has the discretion to apply regarding its competencies. 
Spain welcomed the creation of the ‘early warning mechanism’ in the Lisbon Treaty and is 
open to discussing ways to improve the functioning of it, including revision of the ‘yellow 
card’ procedure. That being said, Spain’s approach is very pro-integration, so any obstacle to 
‘more Europe’ is generally not welcome. A ‘red card’ system could result in European 
Commission legislation being blocked, so it is not seen as a positive step. Spain opposes 
giving national parliaments veto rights over EU legislation. 
By contrast, a ‘green card’ system is viewed favourably, as it may involve national 
parliaments in a more constructive way. Nevertheless, if adopted, it cannot alter the 
Commission’s exclusive right to initiate legislation.  
Free movement of labour 
Spain considers that the free movement of people is one of the most important achievements 
in the history of European integration. It is thus contrary to Spain’s interests and vision to 
impose caps on intra-EU migration and is clearly a red line for the country. Rather than 
capping, which Spain does not favour, there should be dialogue on how to prevent intra-EU 
migrants from abusing the system. 
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12. The Netherlands 
Adriaan Schout, Senior Research Fellow / Coordinator Europe, Clingendael, The Hague56 
 
General attitudes 
‘Europe must change – otherwise we’ll leave’ threatens the British government. Such threats 
have been made for quite some time now, with only problematic solutions in sight. The 
Netherlands has been sympathetic to British demands for reform for a long time, mainly 
because it fears an EU in which southern countries with stronger regulatory traditions gain 
influence. The Dutch have been strong supporters of British membership ever since the start 
of the European integration project. In The Hague, however, it is clear at this stage that 
regardless of the outcome, the British referendum can only have losers. Certain points on the 
UK’s wishlist are inconsequential. The rest vary from being unclear to damaging for the 
eurozone and are not supported by the Netherlands. The heated debates over changes that 
have been initiated by Prime Minister David Cameron mainly reflect national political 
sentiment in the UK and find little support in the Netherlands. The impression is mounting 
that the UK’s support for membership is so unstable that it may as well leave the Union. In 
any case, the idea is gaining ground that ‘the ball is in their court’ and that making 
concessions that may harm the eurozone could be more dangerous than Brexit. 
Nevertheless, the Dutch would favour the UK’s continued membership of the EU. At the 
same time, however, there are growing concerns about the content of Britain’s demands. The 
negotiating style of Cameron and his ministers is cause for concern and raises questions 
about the sustainability of British membership. It is hoped that the British government and 
voters will use the coming months leading up to the referendum to reflect on the viability of 
their arguments and on their self-perception.  
Economic and monetary integration 
First and foremost, Cameron wants no distinction to be made between euro countries and 
countries that keep their own currency. The British believe that the EU is all about the 
internal market and do not want the eurozone to become some sort of ‘first-class EU’. The 
UK government does not accept that a healthy euro is the euro countries’ highest priority. 
For the Netherlands, any policy to be agreed upon will have to be judged by the euro 
countries in terms of its consequences for the euro. For instance, the British regard bank 
regulation as an internal market issue. Yet in the eyes of the eurozone countries, banks pose a 
systemic risk that needs to be contained. Similarly, for the UK, European labour migration is 
a threat to its welfare state, whereas migration is essential for the sustainability of the 
eurozone.  
                                                     
56 This elaborated version is based on an article by the author in the NRC, “If the British want to leave the 
EU, let them”, 8 December 2015. 
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This distinction between euro-ins and euro-outs is likely to increase. France and Germany (as 
well as the Netherlands and other countries) will probably concentrate their efforts on 
making the euro a viable and successful project. Discussions about necessary treaty changes 
are envisaged for some time after 2017 and, as can be seen from the first and the second 
presidency reports (of 2012 and 2015), ideas for strengthening the eurozone are being 
elaborated and will remain high on the political agenda. This will also include debates on the 
size and functions of the EU budget. Northern countries may accept the French proposal for 
a separate EU budget as long as it is linked to national economic reforms. Moreover, 
discussions on a separate, eurozone type of European Parliament (e.g. based on a 
combination of national MPs and MEPs from eurozone countries) or a specific European 
parliamentary committee will probably figure prominently in the upcoming reform debates. 
Economic control over member states is likely to increase. Economic contracts may still be a 
possibility. Hence, Cameron’s first wish, to avoid a gap between the eurozone and the rest of 
the EU, seems outdated: the euro is of overriding importance. 
One implication of the current Brexit discussions concerns the role of the UK in the treaty 
change negotiations that will start sometime after 2017. Treaty change is to be expected with 
a view to elaborating economic policy coordination within the eurozone. If the UK decides to 
stay in the EU, it will be unacceptable if this decision is immediately followed by obstructive 
behaviour during the negotiations on deeper economic integration. The UK will probably be 
in an uncomfortable position if it has to move straight from its EU referendum to treaty 
change negotiations. Future Dutch governments will most probably continue looking for 
ways to reinforce the EU and the eurozone, and it will not help if the UK decides to stay in 
but is uncooperative when it comes to taking steps towards a stronger eurozone. In the run-
up to the British referendum, it should be made clear that continued membership would 
involve a cooperative attitude in the upcoming negotiations on institutional reforms.  
As current discussions in the UK suggest, the British government has lost the necessary 
touch for eurozone negotiations. For example, ministers George Osborne (finance) and 
David Lidington (EU affairs) have emphasised the ‘remorseless logic’ of centralisation of the 
eurozone. The British government seems to emphasise subsidiarity for itself but holds that 
the eurozone should centralise. First of all, this notion of centralisation of the eurozone seems 
difficult to reconcile with the British demand to remain – as a non-euro country – an equal 
player in the EU. Second, there are different ways of reinforcing the eurozone. The UK is 
stressing centralisation as remorseless logic while eurozone countries themselves are looking 
for alternative ways to strengthen economic coordination. It is hard to see at this stage 
whether or how the UK can play a constructive role in the upcoming negotiations on reforms 
of the Treaty. The UK threatens to be a hindrance rather than a friend to the Netherlands by 
either blocking economic policy reforms or pressing for centralisation.  
Competitiveness 
The second concession that the British want to enforce is the recognition that competitiveness 
should be the most important EU principle. This demand fails to recognise that EU policy is 
always assessed against several criteria, including its effects on global competitiveness. 
Large-scale deregulation operations have already been high on the agenda for quite some 
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time. EU policy is recognised to be of high quality and the British have not been able to 
prove otherwise. Moreover, the EU also seeks to take other objectives into account, such as 
sustainability. A British competitiveness diktat is unworkable because European countries 
may have other, possibly more mature, considerations, for instance as regards bank 
regulation.  
The insistence on ‘competitiveness’ is also telling of the British self-image. It suggests that the 
UK is more oriented towards competition than the rest of the EU. However, the British 
demand to curtail labour migration is nothing less than an attack on one of the four 
freedoms. It is hard to understand how the UK can both insist on competitiveness as a 
leading principle and demand a curb on labour mobility. Its self-image as a competitive 
country contradicts its desire to protect its welfare state. Apparently, competition is key but 
not when it comes to labour market conditions. Besides this major inconsistency, the UK is 
sending the message that it distrusts the quality and competitiveness of EU policies. Yet, 
despite 32 studies on the balance of competencies, the UK has failed to pragmatically 
substantiate its criticism of EU legislation. The British criticism of the EU’s competitiveness 
borders on fact-free politics. 
Sovereignty 
The third set of British demands is about European symbols. This quickly becomes quite 
technical as well as pointless. Cameron wants the reference to an ‘ever closer union’ taken 
out of the Treaty. Already in June 2014, these three words were stripped of their significance 
by the European Council’s statement that they have no special meaning. Nevertheless, the 
British want them symbolically removed. They also want national parliaments to be able to 
issue a ‘red card’ to the European Commission in order to stop policy initiatives. This red 
card should give national parliaments a sense of control. Cameron believes in the 
‘sovereignty’ of the British parliament and wants the British citizen to regain trust in the EU 
through the red card. ‘Yellow’ and ‘orange cards’ already exist, but I have never met a citizen 
who got a pro-EU feeling from them. More important than a symbol of national self-esteem 
is that red cards may be damaging for the eurozone. If the card could work, then France and 
Italy, to name two, would only be too happy to use it to stop the legislation needed to 
liberalise the eurozone. A red card may have negative consequences for the internal market, 
where reforms are needed, but the damage to the eurozone might be a lot worse.  
Moreover, these claims imply treaty reforms, and thus referenda and vetoes in, among 
others, the Netherlands. Unilateral demands for a red card are therefore not welcomed in the 
Netherlands. In general, the Dutch favour a stronger role for national parliaments, but at this 
point it is unlikely that a veto with a low threshold in terms of the number of parliaments is 
regarded as a wise development of the yellow and orange cards as they exist currently. 
Free movement of labour 
The last field of reform concerns the treatment of migrant workers. Demands in that respect 
may restrict the free movement of workers, and thus in the Netherlands are considered 
incompatible with internal market policy and are potentially damaging to the eurozone. Free 
movement of persons is necessary to make sure that unemployed people from one country 
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can work in another country. If free movement is restricted, the eurozone will need a social 
safety net – which is unfeasible and unwelcome. Cameron does not seem to care about the 
eurozone’s need for labour mobility, given that he distances himself completely from the 
euro. The British wish to limit labour mobility stems from overdue reforms to their own 
welfare state and from opposition by the UK Independence Party to East European workers. 
Cameron needs to resolve this at home, not at EU level. The Dutch government is keen to 
address abuse of the free movement of labour57 and to find reassuring formulations to 
address British concerns, but it is not willing to undermine the core principles of European 
integration. 
The British negotiating style needs reforming 
The shortlist of desired reforms hardly justifies the stampede of Cameron’s Brexit debate. 
The UK finds implicit or explicit fault with the EU and EU member states. It is typical of 
British arrogance that they think they are sovereign, that other member states would not 
want meaningful competition, and that they see themselves – but not other member states – 
as global players. The discussions say a lot about the UK and little about the EU. The 
atmosphere in The Hague seems to be that British membership is preferred but if Cameron 
contemplates an exit, so be it. There are limits to the ‘goodwill factor’. 
The situation may have come to the point that it may not matter much whether the UK has 
one foot in the EU or one foot out. As a member, the UK is likely to continue contemplating 
exit and to be unhappy about the ‘Eurocracy’. In that case, for the foreseeable future, it will 
keep one foot out of the EU. As a non-member, however, the UK will probably remain 
highly engaged with the EU’s geopolitics (notably concerning relations with Russia and 
monitoring refugee flows across the Mediterranean) and with internal market policies. 
Hence, after Brexit, it will try to keep one foot in. 
Whether with one foot in or one foot out, what will remain particularly worrying is the 
British tone with which it is managing its relations with the EU and with its European 
‘friends’. Cameron decided to give his in/out speech (which became known as the 
‘Bloomberg speech’) in Amsterdam. The Dutch government of Prime Minister Mark Rutte 
had just changed from Rutte 1 (supported by the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders and hence 
critical of the EU) to Rutte 2. The new government was thus looking for a more positive 
European tone and was certainly not interested in sharing a podium or a photo opportunity 
with Cameron if it was related to the referendum. Apparently, the British government did 
not even have the courtesy to check at a diplomatic level whether the Dutch government was 
interested in playing a part in (or even hosting) the in/out speech in Amsterdam. In addition 
to this diplomatic mishap, Cameron raised the issue of the referendum by demanding to 
renegotiate the ‘balance of competencies’. However, the balance of competencies was not at 
stake. The renegotiations concerned the legislation falling under these competencies (the 
acquis). Thus, the start of the discussions was unfortunate, both in terms of diplomatic skill 
and legal correctness. Other British ‘renegotiations’ have not displayed much diplomatic or 
                                                     
57 See A. Schout, J.M. Wiersma and M. Gomes Neto, “The European Asscher agenda, a political and 
economic minefield”, Policy Brief, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 2015. 
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legal expertise either, as discussed above. There is wider concern about EU policies among 
member states (including in the Netherlands), but the British approach so far has not 
resulted in lasting coalitions for reform. Change and the corresponding negotiations take 
time. The EU has come a long way by elaborating arguments together with other EU 
member states, finding wider support and negotiating compromises. The British style of ‘if 
we do not get our way now, we will leave’ does not work in the EU – it does not work now 
and it will not work in the future. This UK government shows above all that it does not 
understand how the EU works.  
Real European competition 
The possible Brexit is often discussed in terms of threats – threats to the integrity of the 
internal market and to the EU’s geopolitical powers. Yet Brexit could also offer an advantage. 
In 1996, Albert Breton concluded that the EU was more harmonised than the federations of 
the US or Canada. 58  The UK’s departure from the EU would create a new form of 
competition for the eurozone and the internal market. Foreign direct investments could go 
back to the UK, UK production might flourish and UK labour markets might outperform EU 
labour markets. Such developments would provide the EU with a new role model and 
stimulate reforms. Conversely, if instead the EU outperforms the UK, it will be a reassuring 
sign to European citizens that the EU is not doing so badly after all. Brexit might bring back 
policy competition and therefore be a contribution to EU competitiveness. 
 
  
                                                     
58 See A. Breton, Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance, Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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13. United Kingdom 
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska, Research Fellow, Centre for European Reform, London59 
 
General attitudes 
In 2013, David Cameron promised the British people that if he remained prime minister after 
the general election he would reform the UK’s relationship with Europe and put the case to 
an in/out referendum. After the Conservative Party’s electoral victory in May 2015, 
Cameron embarked on a charm offensive across EU capitals to obtain support for his reform 
plans. Cameron thought that the less specific he was on what he wanted, the better. He 
feared that by revealing his exact plans he would expose himself to heavy criticism by his 
party’s Eurosceptics and to their demands for ‘the impossible’.  
This lack of clarity served David Cameron’s ends, who wanted to keep his Eurosceptics 
guessing. But for European leaders, his blind-man’s bluff was a distraction from Europe’s 
other challenges, namely the refugee crisis. Member states therefore pressed Cameron to 
reveal his plans in greater detail so that they could start working on their own negotiating 
positions. The British prime minister bowed to this pressure and elaborated on the major 
themes of his reform plans in a letter to Donald Tusk, the European Council President, dated 
10 November 2015.60 Those who might have expected detailed legal proposals in the letter 
were surely disappointed. Yet the letter at least ended the UK government’s long phoney 
war with Brussels and helped to organise discussions about the reform package between 
Britain and the other 27 member states. Cameron hoped that he could reach a deal when EU 
leaders gathered in Brussels in February 2016 and then hold a referendum this year. This 
paper tries to explain the British government’s priorities in the negotiations and the 
challenges it has faced. 
Competitiveness 
The UK government wishes to boost Europe’s competitiveness and estimates that services 
generate 90% of new jobs but account for only 20% of intra-EU trade. Thus, British officials 
estimate that full implementation of the EU’s existing Services Directive could add around 
1.8% to the EU’s GDP.61 The British Business Taskforce on cutting red tape made the point 
that scrapping the requirement to write down health and safety risk assessments could save 
business across Europe €2.7 billion.62 The British government thinks that if the EU does not 
deepen its single market, particularly in services, and reduce the regulatory burden on 
                                                     
59 This piece builds on CER research and in particular on the CER policy brief by the author, “Cameron’s 
EU reforms: Will Europe buy them?”, CER Policy Brief, CER, London, December 2015.  
60 See the letter by David Cameron to European Council President Donald Tusk, “A new settlement for the 
United Kingdom in a reformed European Union”, 10 November 2015. 
61 See the UK Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, “UK non-paper: Deepening single market in 
goods and services”, London, July 2015. 
62 See Business Taskforce, “Cut EU red tape: Report from the Business Taskforce”, Policy Paper 14 February 
2014 (www.gov.uk). 
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European business it will lose a ‘global race’ against other emerging powers. It also wants to 
make life easier for consumers who prefer to shop online rather than queue in supermarkets. 
Today, firms try to oblige customers to buy products from a website based in their own 
country but Cameron thinks that this is unjustified price discrimination and aims to fight it. 
Finally, the British prime minister would like to see more ambitious trade deals with world 
partners. 
In fact, the European Commission has already taken up the gauntlet in many of the above 
areas. Commissioner Günther Oettinger proposed a strategy for the Digital Single Market on 
6 May 2015 and Commission First Vice President Frans Timmermans published a Better 
Regulation Package on 19 May. The Commission also announced a new trade and 
investment strategy in October 2015. But for tactical reasons, the Commission will allow 
Cameron to claim some credit for the ongoing dynamics in the area of competitiveness. 
Sovereignty 
The British government wants to strengthen the role of national parliaments in EU decision-
making. Today, national parliaments can cooperate to show the European Commission a 
‘yellow’ or an ‘orange card’ when they think that EU-wide legislation is not necessary and 
that lower levels of government can better deal with the subject matter (the subsidiarity 
principle).63 But the European Commission can still press on with the proposal. This has been 
subject to heavy criticism among Conservative backbenchers, who have argued that MPs are 
more attuned to citizens’ concerns than the technocrats in Brussels and that Cameron should 
demand changes. National parliaments, in their view, should be able to show the 
Commission a red card and veto its proposals. The House of Lords EU Select Committee 
urged the British government in July 2015 to pick up on the ongoing debate in the rest of 
Europe on a ‘green card’ initiative, whereby national parliaments can suggest that the 
Commission proposes, modifies or withdraws laws. British peers thought that EU leaders 
would be keener on the idea that promotes a constructive role for parliaments in the EU.64 
The renegotiation simulations that were organised by CEPS on 7-8 October in Brussels 
suggested that the British peers were right. EU experts standing in for EU leaders in the 
simulations had more sympathy for the idea of green cards than red ones.65  
But Cameron focused in his letter to Donald Tusk exclusively on an arrangement that would 
allow a group of parliaments to stop unwanted EU legislation. Budapest and Warsaw like 
the idea of red cards, but a majority of member states think that parliaments should focus on 
                                                     
63 National parliaments have two votes (one vote per chamber in bicameral parliaments) that they can cast 
against European Commission proposals if they think that the subsidiarity principle has been breached. A 
third of votes (and a fourth in the area of justice and home affairs) constitutes a yellow card and more than 
half of votes an orange card. If parliaments show an orange card to a Commission proposal, 55% of the 
members of the Council of the EU or the European Parliament by a simple majority can decide not to 
consider the Commission’s proposal any further. 
64 See the House of Lords European Union Committee, The referendum on UK membership of the EU: Assessing 
the reform process, 3rd Report of Session 2015‒16, London: Stationary Office Ltd., 28 July 2015. 
65 See S. Blockmans and S. Weiss, “Will Cameron get what he wants? Anticipating reactions to Britain’s EU 
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scrutinising their governments’ European policies. They fear that empowering parliaments 
with a red card would create chaos rather than make the EU decision-making process more 
efficient. Moreover, putting red cards on a legal footing requires a treaty change, which the 
vast majority of member states do not want.66 Still, Cameron will probably try to convince 
the European Commission to voluntarily withdraw its proposals whenever parliaments 
show it a yellow card. If that does not work, he may want to persuade member states to 
block Commission proposals whenever parliaments show an orange card. Both 
arrangements would stand some chance of being accepted by the current opponents of red 
cards if the threshold were higher than the current one envisaged for parliaments putting 
forward reservations about Commission proposals. This is because critics would find it 
difficult to claim that Cameron was pushing for changes that circumvent EU Treaties or that 
red cards would paralyse decision-making. Until now, parliaments have reached the 
threshold for yellow cards only twice and have failed to show any orange card. It is difficult 
to imagine that a new procedure would result in large numbers of red cards. 
Moreover, the British government wants the EU to recognise that the ‘ever closer union’ does 
not apply to the UK. In June 2014, the European Council reassured prime minister Cameron 
in its conclusions that ever closer union allows for different paths of integration and 
therefore Britain will not be forced to integrate more deeply if it does not want to. But this is 
not satisfactory to Conservative Eurosceptics, who have complained that the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) has used this concept to back judgments that pave the way for 
more European integration, with which Britain does not feel comfortable.  
There is no doubt that British demands have ruffled feathers and raised eyebrows elsewhere 
in the EU: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) indicates that the EU should seek to work 
towards ever closer union “among the peoples…in which decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity”.67  They think that the 
British government’s concerns that the EU and its institutions will pursue an integrationist 
agenda on the basis of this concept are overblown. The analysis of the House of Commons 
Library also indicates that the CJEU does not refer to this concept too often.68 But precisely 
because the majority of member states see little relevance in this concept for the EU’s further 
integration they may be willing to accommodate Cameron’s concerns if it helps him to argue 
for the ‘remain’ stance in the referendum.  
Economic and monetary integration 
The British prime minister wants the EU to accept that European integration is a ‘multi–
currency’ project in which the rights of both ‘euro-ins’ and ‘-outs’ are equally protected. The 
British fear that the eurozone, which now has a voting majority in the Council of the EU 
                                                     
66 Poland may be an exception. The Polish government signalled that it was open to most of Cameron’s 
proposals, including those that would require changes to the EU Treaty architecture; see A. Bartkiewicz, 
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67 See the preamble of the EU Treaties and Art. 1 of the TEU. 
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(although until 2017 member states can adhere to the old voting procedure) will not hesitate 
to gang up on Britain and other euro-outs. The incident with the bridging loan for Greece 
only strengthened Eurosceptic concerns about a eurozone caucus. The eurozone countries 
attempted to use the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism to provide financial 
assistance to Greece without consulting euro-outs, although the latter contributed to the 
fund. Only after the intervention of the European Council president were the deliberations 
shifted to the EU-28 level. In his letter to Donald Tusk, Cameron asked other EU leaders to 
make sure that any issues that affect all member states are discussed and decided by the EU-
28 and that the integrity of the single market is protected. He also wants to obtain a 
guarantee that the British people are not liable for any actions to rescue euro-ins that face 
financial troubles.  
Cameron pledged that he was not looking for veto rights over eurozone decision-making. 
Member states have worried that he would demand a veto for the City of London, the British 
financial centre. But Cameron has apparently learnt a lesson from December 2011 when 
member states refused to tolerate his transactional political style (he demanded certain 
privileges for the City of London in exchange for consent to a treaty change.) Yet, at the time 
of writing, Cameron has not revealed which legal mechanisms would help him to ensure a 
fair relationship between euro-ins and euro-outs. Experts in London and in Brussels have 
pointed to, among others, the idea of an ‘emergency brake’. The emergency brake could be 
triggered by any of the euro-outs if they worried that eurozone deliberations would affect 
the integrity of the single market. The European Council would have to review the matter 
and look for a compromise.69 According to these ideas, euro-outs would only be able to delay 
decisions rather than block them for good. But euro-ins worry that such a mechanism would 
hamper the eurozone’s capability to respond to crisis situations and Cameron will need to 
twist some arms in eurozone countries to garner support for the idea of safeguards for euro-
outs. He will struggle, however, to secure legal recognition that euro membership is 
voluntary for all, as this would require a treaty change. The TEU indicates that the EU’s 
objective is an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) whose currency is the euro and all 
member states, apart from Britain and Denmark, are legally committed to adopt the common 
currency. Member states will probably see little harm in recognising the current status quo 
that EU countries use different currencies. 
Free movement of labour 
Finally, the British government wants to exert greater control on migration from within the 
EU. It wants to restrict free movement of EU workers from any further states joining the 
Union. In its view, EU citizens from new member states should be denied this right until 
their economies have converged with those of their Western peers. It thinks that this is a win-
win situation for both old and new member states: it would help to stem a pressure that the 
EU workers have exerted on the public services of the host countries and would address the 
problem of brain drain in new member states. But there is no appetite in the EU to expand 
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anyway, as it struggles to safeguard its current borders. And in any case, Montenegro, the 
only country with a chance of EU accession in the foreseeable future, only has a population 
of 620,000 and would not constitute a great strain on the British economy.  
But Cameron has gone a step further; he wants to curb access to in-work benefits and social 
housing for citizens from the current member states for the first four years after their arrival 
in the UK. In the letter to Tusk, he also said he wanted to halt the child allowances paid to 
EU workers if the children are not resident in the UK. A compromise may be possible in the 
area of child allowances, as some member states, like Belgium and Denmark, share Britain’s 
frustration. Furthermore, the European Commission is planning to review the current law on 
the coordination of social security systems, which opens a window of opportunity for 
Cameron. But he will find it very difficult to convince the other 27 EU member states of his 
idea to limit access to in-work benefits if it entails discrimination between EU and British 
workers. The principle of non-discrimination of EU workers on the basis of their nationality 
is a central plank of the single market and is inscribed in the EU Treaties. There is little, if no 
appetite to dismantle this principle. 
Outlook 
Donald Tusk, who coordinates talks between Britain and other member states, will try to 
help the British government and pave the way for a deal in February 2016. In his letter to the 
EU leaders of 7 December 2015, Tusk urged all member states to seek a compromise that 
would benefit both the UK and the EU by “cementing foundations on which the EU is 
based”.70 If Cameron follows Tusk’s advice and refrains from demanding changes to the 
rules that have driven the single market – one of the few EU policies still seen as among 
Europe’s greatest achievements – he stands a chance of obtaining a quick deal based on his 
reform package. 
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